

## Addressing the Gender Gap:

### The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Women's Electoral Engagement<sup>1</sup>

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#### Abstract (146 words)

In light of gender disparities in political involvement, extant research has examined mechanisms for incorporating ordinary women into politics. We complement this literature by exploring the effect of an overlooked institution theorized to promote political equality by maximizing voter turnout: compulsory voting. We theorize that in enforced compulsory voting systems women are more likely to *receive* and *seek* information about electoral choices than their counterparts in voluntary voting systems. Consequently, compulsory voting helps narrow the gender gap beyond voting by creating opportunities and motivations for women to engage with the electoral process and its main actors. Our multilevel analysis based on cross-national survey data lends strong support to our hypotheses. Countries with enforced mandatory voting laws display a much smaller gender gap not only in voting, but also in several other forms of electoral engagement, including political party information, campaign attentiveness, party attachment, and campaign participation.

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**Key Words:** Political Behavior, Public Opinion, Gender Gap, Compulsory Voting.

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Improving gender equality in political engagement is essential for the promotion of representative democracy around the world. Ordinary women in several countries still vote at a lower rate than men, and in most countries women are less engaged in other areas of politics (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2012; Paxton & Hughes, 2014). For instance, women typically have more limited access to political information (Barabas, et al., 2014; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1992, 1996) and engage with electoral campaigns at lower rates (Ordecin & Jones-White, 2011). A widely cited approach to encourage ordinary women's political engagement is the adoption of institutions that promote the representation of women in government and more proportional electoral outcomes, such as legislative gender quotas and proportional representation (PR) systems (Baldez, 2004; Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010, 2012; Krook, 2014). Yet, empirical studies exploring the effects of these institutions on the gender gap have yielded mixed results. In this paper, we examine the impact of an institution that remains largely understudied in this literature: compulsory voting (CV).

Building on recent studies demonstrating that compulsory voting has a positive effect on various forms of political behavior (e.g., Shineman, 2012; Singh & Thornton, 2013)—particularly among disadvantaged populations (e.g., Fowler, 2013; Gallego, 2015), we argue that CV laws enforced via costly sanctions (herein enforced CV) can reduce the gender gap *in* and *beyond* voting. Despite the fact that women typically face higher barriers to acquire political information, we theorize that women in countries where voting is obligatory will be more likely to *receive* and *seek* information about their voting choices during electoral campaigns than their female counterparts in voluntary voting (VV) systems. Thus, CV incentivizes women to engage with the electoral process, resulting in a narrower gender gap in various forms of electoral engagement. Two main mechanisms are at the core of these expectations.

First, when all citizens are required by law to cast a ballot, discussion of politics becomes vibrant and political information more readily available during electoral campaigns (Birch, 2009; Shineman, 2012). Consequently, individuals who typically have a harder time acquiring political information, such as women, have more opportunities to *receive* or be exposed to information about contending political parties. Second, women should be more inclined to *seek* information about political parties during electoral campaigns in countries with enforced CV laws. Due to their more limited resources, women in these countries are more likely than men to perceive the cost of voting in election after election as an expensive non-recoverable cost (i.e., a sunk cost).<sup>5</sup> Women should then be particularly motivated to actively seek information on political parties to avoid wasting their vote.

In short, as CV laws create opportunities and motivations for women to acquire political information, we should observe higher rates of female engagement with the electoral process and its main actors, particularly political parties. In this paper, we search for evidence supporting these expectations by taking into account multiple indicators of electoral engagement. Our empirical analyses rely on post-election survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) gathered between 1996 and 2011 in a large number of countries across all regions of the world. The results of our multilevel analysis are consistent with our theoretical expectations. Compared to VV systems, countries that promote voter turnout through enforced CV laws have smaller gender gaps not only in voting, but also in political party information, electoral campaign attentiveness, political party attachment and participation in electoral campaigns. Notably, these results are robust even after we account for the effect of women's numeric representation in the legislature and the proportionality of the electoral system.

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<sup>5</sup> For a general discussion on sunk-cost effects associated with CV, see Shineman (2009, 2012).

## **Origins of the Gender Gap and the Impact of Political Institutions**

A prominent explanation for the existence of a gender gap in political engagement points to women's more limited access to resources (Brady et al., 1995; Schlozman et al., 1994; Verba et al., 1997). As one author puts it, "confining and isolating roles [such as wife, mother, or homemaker] do not permit access to political resources such as time, money, contacts, organizational life, [and] channels of communication" (Jennings, 1983, p. 364). Even though women across the world now have greater access to education and the labor market, they are still paid lower salaries than men for the same jobs, and continue to be largely responsible for care and housework (Ferguson, 2013). On a given day, women around the globe spend from two to ten hours more than men caring for others in the household, and from one to three hours more on housework (World Bank, 2012, p. 17).

Having fewer resources not only means that women might find it more difficult to go to the polls or attend political events, but also that they face higher barriers to acquiring political information more generally. Women are less likely to be part of social groups where politics is discussed (Norris & Inglehart, 2006), making the acquisition of political information more costly for them (Gidengil et al., 2006; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1986; Popielarz, 1999). By contrast, men devote more time to after-work activities outside the home, and thus can more easily acquire political information through membership in social groups concerned with public affairs, such as labor unions and business organizations. In short, fewer resources result in higher costs of political participation for women and also make access to political information more difficult. The end result is typically a gender gap in various forms of political engagement.

Previous studies, however, have documented that the size of the gender gap varies across countries (Beauregard, 2014; Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010, 2012; Nir & McLurg, 2015),

and that in some countries men and women engage in certain forms of political involvement at the same rate—especially when it comes to voting. These cross-national differences suggest that contextual factors are important determinants of the gender gap. An important line of research points to the relevance of institutional design to explain national patterns of women’s political behavior. Scholars argue that *inclusive* institutions that promote political representation encourage female political engagement (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2012), and thus help narrow the gender gap. Two political institutions are highlighted in this literature: gender quotas and proportional representation (PR).

Scholars theorize that a higher level of women’s numeric representation in the legislature—typically the result of effective gender quotas (Jones, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Tripp & Kang, 2008)—can spur political engagement among ordinary women by making them more likely to believe that their policy interests will be advanced, and that politics is not only a man’s game (Burns et al., 2001; Karp & Banducci, 2008; Verba et al., 1997). Similarly, relative to plurality systems, PR systems that result in the representation of a larger number of political parties have been theorized to promote higher participation rates among ordinary women by making them perceive political systems as overall more inclusive (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010, 2012). Under PR, political parties are also expected to compete for the vote of traditionally disengaged citizens, including women, and consequently mobilize them to vote (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2012).

The existing empirical evidence on the impact of such inclusive institutions on the gender gap, however, remains inconclusive. While some studies show that a higher percentage of women in the legislature results in a narrower gender gap in political engagement (Barnes & Burchard, 2013; Burnet, 2011; Desposato & Norrander, 2009), other research finds little support

for this relationship (Karp & Banducci, 2008; Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2012; Lawless, 2004). Studies examining the impact of quota adoption per se on women's political behavior report a null effect (Barnes & Burchard, 2013; Zetterberg, 2009). By contrast, a recent study finds that the adoption of quotas can in fact *reduce* women's political engagement (Clayton, 2015). With respect to PR systems, Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010, 2012) find that more proportional outcomes result in a smaller gender gap in various forms of political engagement. Yet, more recent cross-national studies report that PR systems are associated with a *larger* gender gap compared to plurality systems (Beauregard, 2014; Nir & McClurg, 2015). Our assessment of this literature indicates that empirical results on the impacts of gender quotas and PR are mixed even across studies examining similar indicators of political engagement.

This brief review of the literature highlights the need for further investigation into how political institutions can promote women's political engagement around the world. We examine the effect of compulsory voting on the gender gap, taking into account the expected outcomes of gender quotas and PR systems (i.e., a higher numeric representation of women in the legislature and a higher degree of electoral proportionality). In the following pages, we first discuss why countries with mandatory voting laws are likely to show a narrower gender gap in voter turnout. Then, we engage in a theoretical discussion on why CV also has the potential to narrow the gender gap in other types of political engagement, particularly those associated with the electoral process.

### **Compulsory Voting and the Gender Gap in Voter Turnout**

Scholars have found consistent evidence that voter turnout rates are higher in countries where voting is compulsory (Birch 2009; Blais, 2006; Brockington, 2004), particularly when

costly sanctions, such as fines, are strictly enforced (Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011).<sup>6</sup> As participation rates are maximized, CV is expected to also produce more *equal* voter turnout rates (Gallego, 2015; Irwin, 1974; Lijphart, 1997). Gallego (2015) explains, “compulsory voting is the only institution that, by itself, can achieve near-universal voter turnout rates...[as a result, it is a way] to achieve equality in participation by getting voting participation close to its ceiling” (pp. 50-51). Accordingly, empirical studies have shown that CV reduces the gap in voter turnout between low and high-income voters (Fowler, 2013; Singh, 2015), educated and less educated citizens (Gallego, 2015), and young and older individuals (Irwin, 1974; Singh, 2011, 2015). To this date, however, the impacts of CV on the *gender gap* in voter turnout and other behavioral and attitudinal political outcomes remain largely understudied.<sup>7</sup>

Similar to studies demonstrating the potential of CV to help achieve more equal turnout between certain subpopulations, we expect to find a narrower gender gap in voter turnout in countries with CV laws, especially when enforcement mechanisms are in place to ensure citizens abide by the law. When voting is enforced, the cost of abstaining is higher than the cost of voting (e.g., Panagopoulos, 2008), incentivizing nearly all eligible citizens to cast a ballot. Hence, although women typically face a higher cost of voting due to their more limited time and access to other resources, enforced CV laws should generate strong incentives for women to go to the

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<sup>6</sup> Some studies argue that in CV systems citizens turn out to vote not simply out of fear to be sanctioned, but also due to the social and psychological costs of not being perceived as a law-abiding citizen (Funk, 2007; Irwin, 1974; Shineman, 2009). Most of literature on CV, however, shows that compulsory laws that apply costly and enforced sanctions are more effective in mobilizing citizens to turn out to vote (Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011).

<sup>7</sup> We are only aware of one study that explores in a direct way the impact of CV on the gender gap in voter turnout (see Quintelier et al., 2011), finding a null effect. Other studies examining the gender gap in voter turnout have controlled for CV in their empirical models, but not accounted for a likely moderating effect of CV and gender (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012). Moreover, we have not identified studies examining the effect of CV on female electoral engagement beyond voting.

polls. In the aggregate, women should then vote at comparable levels to men. Based on these expectations, we derive the following hypothesis:

*H<sub>1</sub>: The gender gap in voter turnout should be smaller in countries with enforced compulsory voting laws, compared to countries where voting is voluntary.*

### **Compulsory Voting and the Gender Gap in Electoral Engagement Beyond Voting**

Even if CV laws produce higher and more equal voter turnout rates, critics of this institution suggest it might simply force individuals to cast a ballot without truly making them more engaged with the electoral process (Brennan & Hill, 2014; Briggs & Chelis, 2010). In other words, CV might result in more uninformed voters and thus in more wasted votes. In light of this concern, scholars have recently turned their attention to exploring the substantive impacts of mandatory voting (e.g. Birch, 2009; Dalton & Weldon, 2007; Jensen & Spoon, 2011; Mackerras & McAllister, 1999; Singh & Thornton, 2013). We contribute to this burgeoning literature by examining the broader impact of CV on women's *electoral* engagement.

We theorize that enforced CV laws make it more likely for women to *receive* and *seek* information on competing political parties, motivating them to engage with the electoral process as a whole. As a result, we should observe a narrower gender gap in electoral engagement beyond simply voting in countries where voting is mandatory. We argue that this expected effect is driven by two reinforcing mechanisms; enforced CV laws (1) reduce the cost of accessing electoral information for women by increasing the supply of political information, and (2) create a stronger sunk-cost effect among women than men, motivating women in particular to seek electoral information during electoral campaigns. We elaborate on the theoretical basis for each mechanism next.



First, mandatory voting laws change the information environment during electoral campaigns by increasing the salience of political discussion (Birch, 2009; Shineman, 2012). As the number of potential voters increases so does the probability of being exposed to electoral information through informal conversations, creating dense political networks (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). Consequently, although women have more limited involvement in civic groups that facilitate the flow of political information, CV laws reduce women's cost of acquiring political information during electoral campaigns.

Moreover, political parties themselves are likely to increase the supply of electoral information for women. Scholars argue that, as all citizens are equally likely to vote in enforced CV systems, mandatory laws create strong incentives for political parties competing for votes to reach out to all individuals (Keaney & Rogers, 2006; Lijphart, 1997). Parties should facilitate the dissemination of electoral messages to women, and in this way also contribute to reducing the high information costs that females typically face under voluntary voting. Taken together, these theorized effects have important implications for the gender gap. Since women in VV systems are more likely to have limited access to information on their electoral choices than men, CV systems should make women particularly likely to acquire electoral information in comparison to men and their female counterparts in VV countries, reducing the gender gap.

Second, knowing that voting is a requirement election after election and that the cost of abstaining is high, enforced CV systems create strong incentives for citizens in general to seek political information and engage with the electoral process. Engelen (2007), for example, suggests that, "having to vote anyway, citizens might well want to know what the vote is about and what the alternatives are" (p. 32). As such, CV laws create a "sunk cost effect" (Arkes & Blumer, 1985)—meaning that because individuals are aware they will incur a non-recoverable or

sunk cost, they are motivated to continue on a course of action to avoid waste. In enforced CV systems, citizens are then more likely to perceive voting as an expensive sunk cost (Shineman, 2012), which they try to redeem by seeking information about their electoral choices to avoid wasting their vote. Empirical research finds support for this effect; when the cost of abstaining is high, individuals find it “rational to invest in information” during electoral campaigns (Shineman, 2009, p. 5).

Sunk cost effects created by enforced CV, however, should be stronger for women than men. Literature in psychology shows that when a sunk cost represents a higher proportion of an individual’s endowment, the more likely it is that this individual will find it worthwhile to invest further resources in a given endeavor to avoid waste (Garland & Newport, 1991). This is because individuals with fewer resources are more likely to perceive a higher sunk cost associated with a given activity than individuals with more resources. Consequently, since women typically have fewer resources for effectively participating in politics compared to men, women should be more likely to perceive a higher sunk cost associated with voting in election after election compared to men. As a result, on average, women in countries with enforced CV laws will be particularly inclined to seek information on their voting choices during electoral campaigns compared to men in these countries, and also to their female counterparts in countries with VV.

The mechanisms described above suggest that mandatory voting can attenuate two main constraints for the acquisition of political information for women—lack of opportunities and motivation (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). More opportunities to be exposed to and greater motivation to search for political information as women seek to make an informed voting decision should result in higher aggregate levels of engagement with the electoral process and its main actors, such as political parties. Moreover, our previous discussion suggests that as women

are more likely to receive and seek information, these two mechanisms reinforce one another and together contribute to a smaller gender gap in electoral engagement beyond voting. Accordingly, our second hypothesis reads as follows:

*H<sub>2</sub>: The gender gap in electoral engagement beyond voting should be smaller in countries with enforced compulsory voting laws, compared to countries where voting is voluntary.*

Similar to previous studies, our theoretical insights suggest that various forms of electoral engagement should be observed in tandem as voters seek to cast a reasoned vote in enforced CV systems. The pursuit of an informed electoral decision is a multifaceted process that triggers various political behaviors and predispositions (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). We expect that voters, including women, seeking to make an informed voting decision will be more attentive to electoral messages during electoral campaigns (Hutchings, 2003), and in the process also become more informed about their electoral choices (Holbrook, 2002). Greater access to information on their voting choices should also facilitate the formation of preferences on political parties (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). Indeed, our theory suggests that, in CV countries, the primary reason why women seek information to start with is their desire to avoid wasting their vote and thus identify the political party that best aligns with their views and interests. The data we employ allow us to examine multiple forms of electoral engagement among men and women across countries with varying voting laws.

### **Data, Measurement, and Methods**

We test our hypotheses using post-election survey data gathered between 1996 and 2011 in three waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The number of countries included in our models varies from 44 to 32, and the corresponding number of post-election

surveys ranges from 104 to 32, depending on whether an item was included in all three waves of the survey in a given country.<sup>8</sup> To the best of our knowledge, we offer the most comprehensive study on the impact of CV on the gender gap in terms of both the scope of data used (up to three waves of the CSES) and the number of dependent variables examined.

***Dependent Variables.*** To test our first hypothesis, we rely on a measure of *voting*, which records whether a respondent declared that he or she cast a ballot in the most recent election (either presidential or legislative). This variable is included in all three waves of the survey, and is coded 1 if individuals reported voting in the most recent election, or 0 if they reported not voting. Although voting is typically over-reported in survey interviews, and this is true in the CSES survey as well (Netscher, 2010), previous studies in the U.S. and elsewhere find no gender differences in over-reporting of voting (Karp & Brockington, 2005). Therefore, given that our focus is on gender differences rather than on overall voter turnout rates, we do not expect our main conclusions to be affected by over-reporting.

To test our second hypothesis, we use four indicators of electoral engagement available in the CSES survey for a wide range of countries with varying voting laws. The first one allows us to examine our theoretical notion that CV laws facilitate the acquisition of information on voting choices, particularly for women. We create an indicator variable on *political party information*, based on the following question in the last two waves of the survey: “I would like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party. If I come to a party you haven’t heard of or you feel you do not know

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<sup>8</sup> See Table A1 for a complete listing of all post-election surveys and countries included in our analysis for each dependent variable. Herein tables and figures that start with a letter are referencing those in the online appendix.

enough about, just say so. The first party is...”<sup>9</sup> Although providing an answer on the 0-10 scale on this question does not necessarily mean that a respondent has deep knowledge about a political party, individuals who do not select “have not heard of” or “do not know enough about” as an answer are likely to possess a minimum amount of information on a political party, *at least on average*. This is particularly the case because the CSES only includes on the list the “most popular” parties that competed in the election prior to the survey (i.e., those with the highest percentage of votes). We code *political party information* equal to 1 if respondents have an opinion on *all* political parties on the list, or 0 if they selected “have not heard of” or “do not know much about” as an answer for at least one of the listed political parties.<sup>10</sup>

The CSES data also contain a survey item that allows us to evaluate the effect of CV on the propensity to seek information during electoral campaigns—another important link in our theory. A common way to assess information seeking based on survey data is to ask respondents to what extent they followed the news on a given political event (Crigler et al., 2006; Rokkan, 2009; Valentino et al., 2008). The CSES includes a similar item on *campaign attentiveness* in the third wave of the survey, which asks: “How closely did you *follow* the election campaign? Very closely, fairly closely, not very closely, or not closely at all?” To simplify the data analysis, we code *campaign attentiveness* as 1 if individuals report having followed the election campaign

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<sup>9</sup> This item is also available in the first wave of the survey, but answer choices “have not heard of” and “do not know enough” were coded as missing in the dataset by the CSES, which does not allow us to identify individuals who provided these answers. Consequently, to analyze this dependent variable, we only use data for the second and third waves.

<sup>10</sup> Since the number of political parties included on the list varies across countries and elections, we standardize each individual’s score by dividing it by the average score within his or her election sample. Singh and Thornton (2013) and Singh (2015) use a similar index estimation strategy to account for variation across countries and elections in the wording and difficulty of questions on factual political knowledge included in the CSES survey.

“very closely” or “fairly closely,” or 0 if they responded “not very closely” or “not closely at all.”<sup>11</sup>

Another underlying assumption of our theory is that the political information acquired when voting is enforced will aid citizens in the identification of a preferred political party. Therefore, compared to VV systems, in enforced CV systems women in particular should be more likely to express sympathy or preference for a given political party. To examine this specific effect, we take into account an additional measure of electoral engagement, *political party attachment*. We measure an individuals’ political party attachment using the following question included in the three waves of the CSES survey: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?” This variable is coded 1 if individuals report feeling “close” to a party or 0 otherwise. In addition, the CSES data enable us to explore if CV is associated with direct participation in electoral campaigns to support a political party. The question on *campaign participation* in the survey asks: “Here is a list of things some people do during elections. Did you show your support for a particular party or candidate by, for example, attending a meeting, putting up a poster, or in some other way?” Positive responses are coded 1 and 0 otherwise.

We provide descriptive data on the size and statistical significance of the gender gap for each of our five dependent variables in the supplemental materials published online.<sup>12</sup> The gender gap in voting (where women turn out at lower rates than men) is statistically significant in almost one third of the countries in our sample, and the largest of those gaps reaches up to 13 percentage points. By contrast, women engage in the other four forms of electoral engagement we examine at significantly lower rates than men in the majority of countries. The size of the gender gap also varies considerably across these four dependent variables, with some countries

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<sup>11</sup> Using the original 4-point scale does not alter our conclusions (see Table D1).

<sup>12</sup> See Figures A1-A5.

showing statically significant gender gaps as small as 2.1 or as large as 24 percent on a given indicator.

***Core Independent Variables.*** At the individual level, the main independent variable of interest is gender, coded 1 for *female* and 0 for male respondents. At the aggregate level, our core independent variable is a *compulsory voting index* computed based on the coding scheme proposed by Panagopoulos (2008) and adapted by Singh (2011), using data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).<sup>13</sup> We code each post-election survey according to the voting system in place at the time of the most recent election accounting for both the severity of sanctions and the degree of sanction enforcement in countries with CV.

The extent of sanction severity in compulsory systems ranges from fines to infringements of civil rights or disenfranchisement. The severity of sanctions is classified into three different levels: low or no sanctions (when no justification or merely a written explanation for abstention is required), moderate sanctions (when those who abstained face only fines), and severe sanctions (when those who abstained face fines *and* civil rights infringements or disenfranchisement). Enforcement is classified into three different levels: absent or low, moderate, and strict. The final CV Index is constructed by combining both the severity of sanctions and the enforcement of those sanctions. The following values are assigned: 0 if voting is non-compulsory, 1 if voting is compulsory but both sanctions and enforcement are low, 2 if voting is compulsory but both sanctions and enforcement are moderate, 3 if voting is compulsory and *either* sanctions *or* enforcement are high, and a 4 if voting is compulsory and *both* sanctions

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<sup>13</sup> IDEA's coding scheme can be found at [http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory\\_voting.cfm](http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm)

and enforcement are high.<sup>14</sup> To estimate the impact of CV on the gender gap, we specify an interaction term between *female* and the *compulsory voting index*. In the online appendix, we present the values of the index for each country with a compulsory voting system in the sample.<sup>15</sup>

**Control Variables.** At the individual level, we control for *education* and *income* to account for the well-established effect of socioeconomic status on participation (Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1978). Additionally, we add a control variable for the *age* of the respondent along with a quadratic term for age to capture the possibility of an inverted U-shaped relationship between age and electoral engagement. At the aggregate-level, we include in our models a variable that measures the *percentage of women in the legislature*, and interact this variable with *female*.<sup>16</sup> In addition, we interact *female* with a variable that measures the *proportionality* of electoral outcomes based on Gallagher's (1991) index, which compares the percentage of votes to the percentage of seats parties obtain in a legislative election.

We also control for the *effective number of electoral parties* (ENP) to account for two competing effects that can potentially confound the impact of CV. A larger number of competing parties can increase electoral engagement by providing citizens a wider variety of political choices, or it can discourage electoral engagement by making it more difficult to obtain information on each of the contending political parties (Blais & Carty, 1990; Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998). Moreover, as the degree of economic development and democracy can also

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<sup>14</sup> As Singh (2011) indicates, since the extent of sanction severity is typically similar to the extent of sanction enforcement, a composite index based on these four categories is preferred over the inclusion of all possible combinations between the extent of sanction severity and enforcement. For example, cases in which sanctions are severe but enforcement is low are non-existent in our sample. Moreover, it is impossible to have strict enforcement of sanctions if there are no sanctions.

<sup>15</sup> See Table A2.

<sup>16</sup> For a description of this and other aggregate-level control variables, see Table A3.



affect citizens' political involvement (Norris, 2003), we control for the *level of economic development* (Gross Domestic Product per capita) and *democracy* (Freedom House scores). Furthermore, since presidential elections report higher levels of voter turnout than legislative ones (Franklin, 1996; Franklin & Hirczy, 1998), we control for election type with a dummy variable coded 1 if the survey was carried out after a *presidential election* or 0 for post-legislative election surveys.

**Methods.** We rely on multilevel modeling techniques to take into account the nested structure of our data in the estimation of standard errors (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). One important feature of our data stands out: observations are clustered at different levels of analysis, and levels vary slightly depending on the dependent variable. For voting, political party information, campaign attentiveness, and political party attachment, the data are clustered at three levels: respondents  $i$  nested within post-election surveys  $k$ , and post-election surveys nested within countries  $j$ .<sup>17</sup> The model specification for these four dependent variables is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{ikj} = & \beta_0 + \alpha_1 CV Index_{1kj} + \beta_1 Female_{1ikj} + \gamma_1 CV Index_{1kj} \times Female_{1ikj} + \alpha_2 Percent Women Legis_{2kj} \\
 & + \gamma_2 Percent Women Legis_{2kj} \times Female_{1ikj} + \alpha_3 Proportionality_{3kj} \\
 & + \gamma_3 Proportionality_{3kj} \times Female_{1ikj} \dots + \alpha_n X_{nkj} + \dots + \beta_n X_{nikj} \\
 & + Error Term
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where  $\alpha_n X_{nkj}$  are country-year control variables, and  $\beta_n X_{nikj}$  are individual-level control variables.

The survey item on political campaign participation was asked only in one wave of the CSES survey and the sample includes only one post-election survey for each country, which

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<sup>17</sup> Our results remain substantively unchanged if we estimate all our multilevel models only assuming two-levels of analyses (i.e., individuals within post-election surveys).

means that the data are clustered at two levels: respondents  $i$  nested within countries  $j$ . In this case,  $j = k$ :

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \alpha_1 CV Index_{1j} + \beta_1 Female_{1ij} + \gamma_1 CV Index_{1j} \times Female_{1ij} + \alpha_2 Percent Women Legis_{2j} + \gamma_2 Percent Women Legis_{2j} \times Female_{1ij} + \alpha_3 Proportionality_{3j} + \gamma_3 Proportionality_{3j} \times Female_{1ij} \dots + \alpha_n X_{nj} + \dots + \beta_n X_{nj} + Error Term \quad (2)$$

Following Snijders and Bosker's (2012) recommendation, we test the statistical significance of cross-level effects (e.g., between *female* and the CV Index) without assuming a priori a random slope for our individual-level variable of interest (i.e., *female*).<sup>18</sup> Therefore, the models we present only assume random effects for the intercept. Our results, however, remain substantively unchanged when we specify a random coefficient for *female*.<sup>19</sup> As all our dependent variables are coded as binary, we estimate logistic multilevel models.

### **Findings: The Gendered Effects of Compulsory Voting on Electoral Engagement**

Table 1 presents the results of our empirical analyses based on the model specifications depicted in equations 1 and 2 above. The coefficient for the interaction term between *female* and the *compulsory voting index* is positive and statistically significant across our five models ( $p < 0.001$ ). Although all constituent terms associated with an interaction term need to be taken into account simultaneously (Kam & Franzese, 2007), this result suggests that CV is consistently associated with higher electoral engagement, particularly among women.

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<sup>18</sup> As Snijders and Bosker (2012, p. 106) explain, if there is theoretical reason to believe that an interaction between an individual- and group-level variable exists, this interactive effect can be tested using cross-level interaction terms, regardless of whether the individual-level variable has a random slope or not. The reason for this is that statistical tests for cross-level interactions supersede tests for random slopes (Ibid.). More specifically, Snijders and Bosker (2012) state: if there is a significant cross-level interaction, "the test for this interaction has a higher power to detect this [interaction] than the test for the random slope" (p. 106).

<sup>19</sup> See Table D2.

**Table 1. Effect of Compulsory Voting on Women's Electoral Engagement**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.580*** (0.091)	0.743** (0.263)	0.064 (-0.093)	0.299** (0.108)	0.166 (0.146)
<i>Female</i>	-0.358*** (0.063)	-0.706*** (0.070)	-0.534*** (0.080)	-0.319*** (0.045)	-0.196+ (0.108)
<i>Female*CV Index</i>	0.090*** (0.024)	0.093*** (0.020)	0.072*** (0.020)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.096*** (0.029)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.021* (0.010)	-0.011 (0.024)	0.011 (0.01)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.013)
<i>Female* %Women in Legislature</i>	0.009*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.008 (0.019)	-0.026 (0.046)	-0.051+ (0.027)	0.007 (0.021)	-0.037+ (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.021*** (0.005)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.097* (0.046)	-0.022 (0.110)	-0.113** (0.042)	-0.073 (0.051)	0.022 (0.074)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.217* (0.093)	-0.049 (0.162)	-0.053 (0.064)	0.111 (0.077)	-0.271 (0.215)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.421 (0.260)	1.880** (0.585)	0.751** (0.255)	-0.299 (0.258)	0.405 (0.412)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.680** (0.239)	-0.973 (0.645)	1.256*** (0.263)	-0.062 (0.249)	0.028 (0.343)
<i>Education</i>	0.187*** (0.006)	0.187*** (0.006)	0.186*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.004)	0.106*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.155*** (0.007)	0.114*** (0.008)	0.096*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.005)	0.011 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.080*** (0.003)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.272+ (1.981)	-17.815*** (5.064)	-8.571*** (2.153)	0.655 (2.175)	-3.790 (2.507)
<i>N</i>	138,074	98,081	55,660	134,651	40,555
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	35	43	32
<i>Num. Elections</i>	104	77	44	104	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.


To fully evaluate the impact of CV on the gender gap, we first estimate mean predicted probabilities separately for men and women at each point of the CV Index for a given dependent variable, based on the results presented in Table 1 (see Panels A of Figures 1-5). We then proceed to estimate the average gender gap across countries at each point of the CV Index. The gap is the difference in the mean predicted probabilities between men and women, with negative values indicating lower electoral engagement among women than men.<sup>20</sup> Panels B of Figures 1-5 present the average gender gap across values of the CV Index, and its respective 95 percent confidence intervals. If confidence intervals cross the zero line, this indicates that the gender gap is not statistically significant. The graphic representations of our results show remarkably similar patterns across all five modes of electoral engagement we study.

The results for *voting* depicted in Figure 1 provide strong support for H<sub>1</sub>. Panel A indicates that when the CV Index takes its maximum value, the probability of voting is almost universal for all citizens. As the CV index takes higher values, the probability of voting increases substantially for men and women, but this effect is stronger for women. Panel B, in turn, shows that although the average gender gap in voting is statistically significant in countries with voluntary voting (CV Index=0) and equal to 2.1 percent, the gap is no longer statistically different from zero when sanctions and enforcement are moderate (CV Index= 2). The gender gap in voting vanishes at relatively moderate levels of the CV Index, likely because the *average*

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

<sup>20</sup> Predicted probabilities were calculated taking into account the actual values of each independent variable across individual observations in the sample. Mean predicted probabilities are estimated by averaging these probabilities across individual observations. We use the “margins” command in Stata 14.1 to estimate mean predicted probabilities and perform difference in mean tests with the option “contrast,” as described in Mitchell (2012). Notice that our approach for estimating predicted probabilities does not hold constant control variables at their means, but rather takes into account the full variation of the data. As a robustness test, we also calculate predicted probabilities holding control variables at their means, and find similar results (see Figures B1-B5).

gap is relatively small in VV countries, although its size varies substantially across these countries.



**Note:** Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities. Panel B graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results based on Model 1 in Table 1.

When we examine forms of electoral engagement *beyond voting*, we find strong support for H<sub>2</sub>. In the case of *political party information*, Panel A of Figure 2 shows that women’s probability of having information on political parties increases at a higher rate than men’s as the CV index takes higher values. In fact, when the CV Index takes its maximum value (=4), political party information gets very close to its ceiling level for both men and women. As can be observed in Panel B, while in VV countries the average gender gap is statistically significant and equal to 7.9 percent, the gap decreases sharply at higher values of the CV Index until it is no longer statistically significant (i.e., confidence intervals cross the zero line).



**Note:** In Figures 2 and 3, Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities. Panel B in each figure graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results based on Models 2 and 3 in Table 1.



We also observe similar trends for campaign attentiveness (see Figure 3). Panel A shows that enforced CV is associated with a sharper increase in women's likelihood of following campaigns compared to men, contributing to a decline in the gender gap. When voting is voluntary, the gender gap in campaign attentiveness is statistically significant and equal to 11.2 percent (see Panel B of Figure 3); yet, this gap drops to 4.4 percent when voting is compulsory and sanctions and enforcement are high (CV Index=4). Albeit smaller, the gender gap in campaign attentiveness remains statistically significant at the highest level of the CV Index (i.e., confidence intervals do not contain the zero value).

Similar patterns are also observed for the last two indicators of electoral engagement—political party attachment and campaign participation. Panel A of Figure 4 shows that, as the CV index take higher values, both male and females are more likely to report feeling attached to a party, although this effect is stronger for women. Indeed, Panel B of Figure 4 indicates that the gender gap in political party attachment shrinks from 5.2 to virtually zero as the CV Index goes from 0 to 4. For campaign participation, the CV Index varies from 0 to 3 as there are no countries in the sample with a value of 4 on the index. Despite the inclusion of fewer cases, we find that our hypothesized relationship still holds for this dependent variable, suggesting that our findings are not artificially the result of a relatively large sample size.<sup>21</sup> Panel A of Figure 5 shows that participation rates become more comparable between men and women at higher

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<sup>21</sup> We find that the marginal effect of CV for women is statistically significant at conventional levels for all dependent variables. The level of statistical significance, however, varies depending on the number of cases included in the sample for each model. For the three dependent variables included in two or more waves of the survey, this marginal effect is significant at  $p < 0.001$ . For campaign attentiveness and participation, which are only included in one wave of the survey, the marginal effect is statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$  and  $p < 0.10$ , respectively. In all models, however, we find an interaction term between CV and female that is statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$  (see Table 1), indicating that rates between men and women become more comparable at higher values of the CV index, as our hypotheses posit.

levels of the CV Index. In voluntary voting countries, the average gender gap in the probability of campaign participation is statistically significant and equal to 3.7 percent, but this difference is not statistically significant at the highest value of the CV Index (see Panel B of Figure 5).



**Note:** In Figures 4 and 5, Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities. Panel B in each figure graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results based on Models 4 and 5 in Table 1.

Notably, the effect of CV on the gender gap holds for all forms of electoral engagement we examine even when we account for women’s numeric representation and proportionality (see



Table 1), and also when in additional models we consider the impact of gender quotas and PR per se.<sup>22</sup> Although our results on CV are consistent across models, similar to previous studies (e.g. Beauregard, 2014; Clayton, 2015; Nir & McClurg, 2015), we find that inclusive institutions previously theorized to narrow the gender gap in political engagement yield inconsistent results.<sup>23</sup>

### **Further Analyses and Robustness Checks**

Our theoretical framework suggests that women in enforced CV systems in particular engage with the electoral process to avoid wasting their vote. Consequently, it is implied that mandatory voting should be more strongly associated with smaller gender gaps in *electoral* than *non-electoral* forms of political involvement. In this section, we examine the effect of CV on three variables available in the CSES survey that are expected not to be as strongly associated with the electoral process: contacting a public official, participation in protests, and factual knowledge on domestic politics and foreign affairs.<sup>24</sup> First, when we look at the correlations of these three variables with voting behavior, we find that they are indeed not as strongly correlated with voting compared to the four dependent variables in our main analyses, indicating a weaker association with the electoral process. Our additional statistical analyses show that CV does not result in significantly smaller gender gaps in these three proxies of non-electoral engagement.<sup>25</sup> Taken together, these analyses indicate that compulsory voting has a stronger effect on the gender gap in electoral than non-electoral political engagement.

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<sup>22</sup> See Tables C2 and C3.

<sup>23</sup> We discuss these mixed findings in more detail in Box C1 in the online appendix.

<sup>24</sup> For details on the wording and coding of these variables see Table A3.

<sup>25</sup> See Table D3. Although the results indicate that CV increases the overall probability of contacting a politician, this effect is not strong enough among women to narrow the gender gap. By contrast, CV does not exert an effect on the average level of or the gender gap in factual political knowledge or the probability of participating in a protest march.

Another implicit assumption in our theory is that the outcomes we examine should be observed in tandem in countries with enforced CV. In these countries, a woman, for instance, will be more likely to report participation in multiple forms of electoral engagement. To confirm that the average effects we present above are not simply capturing scattered patterns of electoral engagement, we re-estimate our models using a count index as a dependent variable, which reflects the total number of positive responses provided by the same individual across different modes of electoral engagement.<sup>26</sup> Our results lend strong support to the theoretical notion that CV increases the chances for a given individual to engage in *multiple* aspects of the electoral process, particularly for women. The gender gap in the probability of reporting involvement in multiple forms of electoral engagement is considerably smaller in countries with enforced CV.

Additionally, we perform a series of tests to check the robustness of our results to alternative measures of our CV Index, and to the inclusion of other control variables. If we simply recode the CV Index as a binary variable (coded 1 for compulsory voting and 0 for voluntary), we also find a declining gender gap in all forms of electoral engagement, but this measure tends to underestimate the effect of CV on the gender gap, highlighting the importance of considering sanctions and enforcement levels.<sup>27</sup> We also measure CV as a categorical rather a continuous variable. To increase the number of cases in a given category and be able to perform

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<sup>26</sup> Since some of the dependent variables we use in Table 1 are either only included in the second or third wave of the CSES survey, we create a count index for each wave. Each index was calculated based on four dependent variables, including voting, and reflects the count of positive answers across variables, resulting on a scale that ranges from 0 to 4. The count index for the second wave is based on voting, political party information, political party attachment, and campaign participation. The count index for the third wave is based the same items, except that instead of including campaign participation it includes the item on campaign attentiveness. We present the results of these analyses in Table D4.

<sup>27</sup> See Tables D5 and D6. When the binary variable indicates that voting is compulsory (=1), the results depict larger gender gaps in electoral engagement beyond voting than the results we obtain when we estimate predicted probabilities at the highest value of the original CV Index.

this test with a higher level of precision, we recode the original 5-point CV Index into three categories and conduct the analyses for the dependent variables included in at least two waves of the CSES.<sup>28</sup> In these models, we also observe that predicted probabilities increase at higher rate for women than men, resulting in smaller gender gaps at higher levels of enforcement.<sup>29</sup>

Our results also remain substantively unchanged after we control for several individual-level variables, including membership in a civic group, urban or rural residence, marital status, and attitudes toward the political system as measured by satisfaction with democracy and political efficacy.<sup>30</sup> Given that first round and run-off elections might motivate different political behavior patterns, we also conduct a robustness test to account for this likely effect by controlling for surveys conducted after first round or runoff elections and find similar results.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, because simply controlling for other country-level variables might underestimate the effect of such variables on the gender gap, we interact all aggregate-level control variables in our models with *female*. We find that accounting for the impact of GDP per capita, the level of democracy, and ENP on the gender gap does not alter our conclusions on the effect of CV.<sup>32</sup> Our results are also robust when outlier countries, showing the smallest or largest gender gap on a given dependent variable, are excluded from our main analysis.<sup>33</sup> All in all, the empirical evidence confirms that enforced CV is a strong and robust predictor of a smaller gender gap in several forms of electoral engagement.

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<sup>28</sup> We recoded values 1 and 2 on the index as 1, and values 3 and 4 as 2. The baseline category is equal to 0 and identifies countries with voluntary voting.

<sup>29</sup> See Table D7 and Figures D1-D3.

<sup>30</sup> See Tables D8-D16.

<sup>31</sup> See Table D17.

<sup>32</sup> See Table D18.

<sup>33</sup> See Table D19.

## Conclusion

Our findings on the gender gap are consistent with the observation that the problem of political inequality can be ameliorated by “institutional mechanisms that maximize turnout” (Lijphart, 1997, p.1). The theory and results presented in this article indicate that this assertion comes with an important qualification—enforced compulsory voting is more likely to result in narrower gender gaps in electoral than non-electoral forms of political engagement. As women in countries where voting is enforced by law have more opportunities and incentives to cast an informed vote, they are more likely to engage with the electoral process at rates more comparable to men’s, resulting in smaller or even non-existent gender gaps in multiple indicators of electoral engagement beyond voting.

More specifically, our results show that women in enforced compulsory voting systems are more likely to acquire information on political parties and feel close to a political party. We also find evidence supporting the theoretical notion that women living under CV systems are more likely to seek the political information they need to cast an informed vote—the gender gap in the probability of following electoral campaigns is significantly smaller when voting is mandatory. Notably, women in these countries are not simply passively absorbing electoral information as its supply increases or as they seek political information during campaigns, but they are also becoming active participants in the electoral process by directly getting involved in electoral campaigns to support their preferred political party. In sum, CV laws can help narrow the gender gap in voting where a gap still exists, and more importantly can empower women to become more engaged with the entire electoral process, ultimately contributing to the achievement of more equal rates of electoral engagement between men and women. These effects surface even after we take into account the expected outcomes of gender quotas and proportional

representation, two political institutions theorized in the literature to reduce the gender gap in political involvement.

While our research provides comprehensive evidence of a strong association between compulsory voting and gender equality in electoral engagement, further research is necessary to investigate their *causal* relationship. Given the lack of long time-series survey data, the comparison of rates of political engagement before and after the implementation or abolition of compulsory voting across a large number of countries is a challenging task. Previous studies, however, have demonstrated the usefulness of single case studies that rely on experimental or quasi-experimental data for investigating the counterfactual question of what would happen in the absence of compulsory voting (e.g., Fowler, 2013; Shineman, 2009). We see this line of research as a fruitful approach to further investigate the causal effects of compulsory voting for gender equality on outcomes beyond voting.

The theory and analysis we present in this paper, however, complement this research agenda as they indicate that the relationship between mandatory voting and women's electoral engagement enjoys external validity across a large number of countries. Our research contributes to the current debate among policy makers and scholars about how the adoption of certain political institutions and their design can result in more representative democracies by making marginalized groups—in our case, women—more politically active. All in all, our results suggest that enforced compulsory voting laws can help level the playing field in electoral engagement between men and women, and consequently result in more participatory and representative democracies.

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**Addressing the Gender Gap:  
The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Women's Electoral  
Engagement**

ONLINE APPENDIX  
(Intended for Online Publication Only)

**Forthcoming in *Comparative Political Studies***

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# **APPENDIX A: DATA DESCRIPTION**

**Table A1. List of Countries and Post-Election Surveys Included in Each Model**

<b>Code/Post-Election Survey Year</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Voting</b>	<b>Political Party information</b>	<b>Campaign Attentiveness</b>	<b>Political Party Attachment</b>	<b>Campaign Participation</b>
ALB_2005	Albania	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
AUS_1996	Australia	Yes			Yes	
AUS_2004	Australia	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
AUS_2007	Australia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
AUT_2008	Austria	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
BELF_1999	Belgium (Flanders)	Yes			Yes	
BELW_1999	Belgium (Walloon)	Yes				
BGR_2001	Bulgaria	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
BLR_2001	Belarus					
BLR_2008	Belarus					
BRA_2002	Brazil	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
BRA_2006	Brazil	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
BRA_2010	Brazil	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
CAN_1997	Canada	Yes			Yes	
CAN_2004	Canada	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
CAN_2008	Canada	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
CHE_1999	Switzerland	Yes			Yes	
CHE_2003	Switzerland	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
CHE_2007	Switzerland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
CHL_1999	Chile	Yes			Yes	
CHL_2005	Chile	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
CHL_2009	Chile	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
CZE_1996	Czech Republic	Yes			Yes	
CZE_2002	Czech Republic	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
CZE_2006	Czech Republic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
CZE_2010	Czech Republic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

<b>Code/Post-Election Survey Year</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Voting</b>	<b>Political Party information</b>	<b>Campaign Attentiveness</b>	<b>Political Party Attachment</b>	<b>Campaign Participation</b>
DEU_1998	Germany	Yes			Yes	
DEU_2002	Germany	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
DEU_2005	Germany	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
DEU_2009	Germany	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
DNK_1998	Denmark	Yes			Yes	
DNK_2001	Denmark	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
DNK_2007	Denmark	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ESP_1996	Spain	Yes			Yes	
ESP_2000	Spain	Yes			Yes	
ESP_2004	Spain	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
ESP_2008	Spain	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
EST_2011	Estonia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
FIN_2003	Finland	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
FIN_2007	Finland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
FIN_2011	Finland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
FRA_2002	France	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
FRA_2007	France	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
GBR_1997	United Kingdom	Yes			Yes	
GBR_2005	United Kingdom	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
GRC_2009	Greece	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
HRV_2007	Croatia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
HUN_1998	Hungary	Yes			Yes	
HUN_2002	Hungary	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
IRL_2002	Ireland	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
IRL_2007	Ireland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ISL_2003	Iceland	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
ISL_2007	Iceland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

<b>Code/Post-Election Survey Year</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Voting</b>	<b>Political Party information</b>	<b>Campaign Attentiveness</b>	<b>Political Party Attachment</b>	<b>Campaign Participation</b>
ISL_2009	Iceland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ISR_1996	Israel	Yes			Yes	
ISR_2003	Israel	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
ISR_2006	Israel	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ITA_2006	Italy	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
JPN_1996	Japan	Yes			Yes	
JPN_2004	Japan	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
JPN_2007	Japan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
KOR_2000	Republic of Korea	Yes			Yes	
KOR_2004	Republic of Korea	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
KOR_2008	Republic of Korea	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
LTU_1997	Lithuania	Yes			Yes	
MEX_1997	Mexico					
MEX_2000	Mexico	Yes			Yes	
MEX_2003	Mexico	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
MEX_2006	Mexico	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
MEX_2009	Mexico	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
NLD_1998	Netherlands	Yes			Yes	
NLD_2002	Netherlands	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
NLD_2006	Netherlands	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
NLD_2010	Netherlands	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
NOR_1997	Norway	Yes			Yes	
NOR_2001	Norway	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
NOR_2005	Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
NOR_2009	Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
NZL_1996	New Zealand	Yes			Yes	
NZL_2002	New Zealand	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes

<b>Code/Post-Election Survey Year</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Voting</b>	<b>Political Party information</b>	<b>Campaign Attentiveness</b>	<b>Political Party Attachment</b>	<b>Campaign Participation</b>
NZL_2008	New Zealand	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
PER_2006	Peru	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
PER_2011	Peru	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
PHL_2004	Philippines					
PHL_2010	Philippines					
POL_1997	Poland	Yes			Yes	
POL_2001	Poland	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
POL_2005	Poland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
POL_2007	Poland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
PRT_2002	Portugal	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
PRT_2005	Portugal	Yes	Yes		Yes	
PRT_2009	Portugal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ROM_2009	Romania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ROU_1996	Romania	Yes			Yes	
ROU_2004	Romania	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
RUS_1999	Russia					
RUS_2000	Russia					
RUS_2004	Russia					
SVK_2010	Slovakia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
SVN_1996	Slovenia	Yes			Yes	
SVN_2004	Slovenia	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
SVN_2008	Slovenia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
SWE_1998	Sweden	Yes			Yes	
SWE_2002	Sweden	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
SWE_2006	Sweden	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
THA_2001	Thailand			Yes	Yes	
THA_2007	Thailand	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

<b>Code/Post-Election Survey Year</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Voting</b>	<b>Political Party information</b>	<b>Campaign Attentiveness</b>	<b>Political Party Attachment</b>	<b>Campaign Participation</b>
TUR_2011	Turkey	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
UKR_1998	Ukraine	Yes			Yes	
URY_2009	Uruguay	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
USA_1996	United States	Yes			Yes	
USA_2004	United States	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
USA_2008	United States	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

**Table A2. Sanction and Enforcement Levels in Countries with Compulsory Voting in the Sample**

<b>Code/Post-Election Survey Year</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Voting</b>	<b>Political Party information</b>	<b>Campaign Attentiveness</b>	<b>Political Party Attachment</b>	<b>Campaign Participation</b>
AUS_1996	Australia	3			3	
AUS_2004	Australia	3	3		3	3
AUS_2007	Australia	3	3	3	3	
BELW_1999	Belgium (Walloon)	4				
BELF_1999	Belgium (Flanders)	4			4	
BRA_2002	Brazil	2	2		2	2
BRA_2006	Brazil	2	2	2	2	
BRA_2010	Brazil	2	2	2	2	
CHL_1999	Chile	3			3	
CHL_2005	Chile	3	3		3	3
CHL_2009	Chile	3	3	3	3	
GRC_2009	Greece	1	1	1	1	
ITA_2006	Italy	1	1		1	1
MEX_1997	Mexico	1			1	
MEX_2000	Mexico	1			1	
MEX_2003	Mexico	1	1		1	1
MEX_2006	Mexico	1	1	1	1	
MEX_2009	Mexico	1	1	1	1	
PER_2006	Peru	3	3		3	3
PER_2011	Peru	3	3	3	3	
THA_2001	Thailand				1	
THA_2007	Thailand	1	1	1	1	
TUR_2011	Turkey	2	2	2	2	
URY_2009	Uruguay	4	4	4	4	

Numbers indicate the classification of each post-election survey according to the Compulsory Voting Index among countries with a compulsory voting system:

1=low sanctions and low enforcement

2=moderate sanctions and moderate enforcement

3= either sanctions or enforcement are high

4= both sanctions and enforcement are high

**Table A3. Description and Coding of Variables**

Name	Description
<i>Percentage of Women in the Legislature</i>	Data are from the Women in Parliament Database by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2013) <sup>34</sup> . Since the IPU collects monthly data on women's representation in parliament, we base our analysis on data available for the month closest to the election date.
<i>Proportionality</i>	To measure the proportionality of the electoral system, we use Gallagher's (1991) least square measure. The formula is as follows, $LSq = \sqrt{1/2(\sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - S_i)^2)}$ , where $V_i$ refers to the vote percentage of party $i$ , and $S_i$ to the seat percentage for party $i$ . The data for this variable were retrieved from Christopher Gandrud's website ( <a href="http://christophergandrud.github.io/Disproportionality_Data">http://christophergandrud.github.io/Disproportionality_Data</a> ), where the dataset has been updated to include Gallagher's (1991) original data and more recently updated data from Carey and Hix (2011). <sup>35</sup> We multiply the index by -1 so higher values on the index reflects higher levels of proportionality in electoral outcomes in the most recent election prior a given post-election survey. When data on proportionality for a country was not available for a given post-election survey year, the data correspond to the most recent post-electoral outcome estimate available.
<i>Effective number of Parties (ENP)</i>	Data on effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) are from the Democratic Electoral Systems around the World Dataset (Bormann & Golder, 2013). <sup>36</sup> The ENEP variable is calculated using Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) <sup>37</sup> measure, computed using the following formula: $= \frac{1}{\sum v_i^2}$ , where $v_i$ is the percentage of the vote received by the $i^{th}$ party. When an estimate was not available for the election year prior a given post-election survey year, which occurs only in 4 out of 114 cases, the estimate is based on data from the closest election year available.
<i>GDP per capita</i>	GDP per capita data are based on Purchasing Power Party prices (PPP) from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012) <sup>38</sup> , and introduced in the models by taking the logarithm of the variable.
<i>Democracy Level</i>	Democracy data are taken from Freedom House's civil liberties and political rights ratings.
<i>Contacting a Public Official</i>	This is based on the following question in the CSES Survey, wave 2: "Over the past five years or so, have you done any of the following things to express your views about something the government should or should not be doing? Have you contacted a politician or government official either in person, or in writing, or some other way" (1=yes; 0=no)
<i>Participation in Protest</i>	This is based on the following question in the CSES Survey, wave 2: "Have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration?" (1=yes; 0=no)
<i>Factual Political Knowledge</i>	This is based on three questions on factual political knowledge included in the three waves of the CSES Survey. Since the nature and difficulty of the questions vary across countries and elections, we standardize each individual's score by dividing it by the average score within his or her election sample We base our coding on Singh and Thornton (2013) and Singh's (2015) estimation strategy to account for variation across countries and elections in the wording and difficulty of political knowledge questions.

<sup>34</sup> Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). (2013). *Women in national parliaments statistical archive*. Retrieved from <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm>

<sup>35</sup> Carey, J.M., & Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2), 383-397.


<sup>36</sup> Bormann, N. C., & Golder, M. (2013). Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011. *Electoral Studies*, 32(2), 360-369.

<sup>37</sup> Laakso, M., & Taagepera, R. (1979). Effective number of parties: a measure with application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 12 (1), 3-27.

<sup>38</sup> The World Bank. (2012). *World Development Indicators*. Retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org/news/world-development-indicators-2012-now-available>




**Figure A1. Average Gender Gap in Voting**




**Notes:** Negative numbers indicate higher rates for men than women (i.e., a gender gap). Solid black bars indicate that the gap is statistically significant.

**Figure A2. Average Gender Gap in Political Party Information**




**Notes:** Negative numbers indicate higher rates for men than women (i.e., a gender gap). Solid black bars indicate that the gap is statistically significant.

**Figure A3. Average Gender Gap in Campaign Attentiveness**




**Notes:** Negative numbers indicate higher rates for men than women (i.e., a gender gap). Solid black bars indicate that the gap is statistically significant.

**Figure A4. Average Gender Gap in Political Party Attachment**



**Notes:** Negative numbers indicate higher rates for men than women (i.e., a gender gap). Solid black bars indicate that the gap is statistically significant.


**Figure A5. Average Gender Gap in Campaign Participation**



**Notes:** Negative numbers indicate higher rates for men than women (i.e., a gender gap). Solid black bars indicate that the gap is statistically significant.


**APPENDIX B:  
REPLICATION OF  
FIGURES HOLDING  
CONTROL VARIABLES  
AT THEIR MEANS**

**Figure B1. Gender Gap in Voting (holding control variables at their means)**



**Note:** Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities *holding control variables at their means*. Panel B graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results based on the Model 1 in Table 1 in the manuscript.


**Figure B2. Gender Gap in Political Party Information (holding control variables at their means)**



**Note:** Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities *holding control variables at their means*. Panel B graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results based on Model 2 in Table 1 in the manuscript.




**Figure B3. Gender Gap in Campaign Attentiveness (holding control variables at their means)**




**Note:** Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities *holding control variables at their means*. Panel B graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results based on Model 3 in Table 1 in the manuscript.

**Figure B4. Gender Gap in Political Party Attachment (holding control variables at their means)**



**Note:** Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities *holding control variables at their means*. Panel B graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results based on Model 4 in Table 1 in the manuscript.

**Figure B5. Gender Gap in Campaign Participation (holding control variables at their means)**



**Note:** Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities *holding control variables at their means*. Panel B graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results are based on Model 5 in Table 1 in the manuscript.

**APPENDIX C: RESULTS  
AND DISCUSSION OF  
THE EFFECTS OF  
INCLUSIVE  
INSTITUTIONS**

**Table C1. Replication of Results: Examining the Effect of Women’s Numeric Representation and Proportionality Excluding Presidential Elections**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol Party Info	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV)</i>	0.506*** (0.111)	1.365** (0.493)	0.260* (0.130)	0.649*** (0.110)	0.186 (0.188)
<i>Female</i>	-0.409*** (0.078)	-0.630*** (0.099)	-0.667*** (0.109)	-0.445*** (0.060)	-0.275+ (0.159)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.128*** (0.036)	0.414*** (0.057)	0.081* (0.040)	0.092*** (0.023)	0.125** (0.048)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.015 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.027)	0.008 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.014)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.010*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.005)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.006 (0.021)	-0.067 (0.058)	-0.037 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.058* (0.027)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.013* (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.017** (0.006)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.097+ (0.050)	0.016 (0.153)	-0.214*** (0.060)	-0.027 (0.043)	0.071 (0.090)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.292** (0.097)	0.277 (0.250)	0.071 (0.069)	0.323*** (0.062)	-0.092 (0.294)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.499+ (0.295)	1.685* (0.754)	0.664* (0.260)	-0.843*** (0.218)	0.048 (0.476)
<i>Education</i>	0.191*** (0.006)	0.198*** (0.007)	0.178*** (0.007)	0.069*** (0.004)	0.103*** (0.012)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.170*** (0.007)	0.115*** (0.009)	0.095*** (0.008)	0.062*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.015)
<i>Age</i>	0.077*** (0.003)	0.054*** (0.003)	0.011** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.025*** (0.006)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.975 (2.228)	-21.292*** (6.132)	-8.782*** (2.108)	2.591 (1.843)	-3.397 (2.837)
<i>N</i>	113,956	79,578	45,469	110,788	32,248
<i>Num. Countries</i>	37	34	29	36	26
<i>Num. Elections</i>	84	63	36	84	26

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table C2. Replication of Results Controlling for Gender Quota**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.609*** (0.086)	0.784** (0.259)	0.114 (0.092)	0.298** (0.107)	0.200 (0.149)
<i>Female</i>	-0.228*** (0.042)	-0.642*** (0.052)	-0.632*** (0.058)	-0.307*** (0.031)	-0.532*** (0.080)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.074** (0.026)	0.060** (0.023)	0.058** (0.021)	0.050*** (0.015)	0.077* (0.035)
<i>Gender Quota</i>	-0.750*** (0.214)	-0.342 (0.504)	0.275 (0.188)	0.095 (0.224)	-0.523 (0.367)
<i>Female* Gender Quota</i>	0.041 (0.049)	0.127** (0.049)	0.147** (0.047)	-0.029 (0.036)	0.123 (0.095)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.026** (0.009)	-0.019 (0.020)	0.001 (0.008)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.012)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.006*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006* (0.003)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.088* (0.044)	-0.025 (0.101)	-0.137*** (0.040)	-0.077 (0.051)	0.035 (0.072)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.225* (0.088)	-0.059 (0.155)	-0.067 (0.064)	0.115 (0.077)	-0.340 (0.222)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.384 (0.246)	1.858*** (0.547)	0.861*** (0.260)	-0.292 (0.257)	0.418 (0.413)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.794*** (0.226)	-1.043+ (0.629)	1.026*** (0.243)	-0.064 (0.249)	0.124 (0.355)
<i>Education</i>	0.187*** (0.006)	0.187*** (0.006)	0.187*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.004)	0.108*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.155*** (0.007)	0.114*** (0.008)	0.096*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.005)	0.010 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.080*** (0.003)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.922 (1.815)	-17.006*** (4.676)	-8.918*** (2.195)	0.475 (2.104)	-2.545 (2.484)
<i>N</i>	138,074	98,081	55,660	134,651	40,555
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	35	43	32
<i>Num. Elections</i>	104	77	44	104	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table C3. Replication of Results Controlling for PR Systems**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.504*** (0.099)	0.595* (0.241)	0.098 (0.091)	0.329** (0.105)	0.080 (0.147)
<i>Female</i>	-0.049+ (0.025)	-0.499*** (0.031)	-0.387*** (0.032)	-0.153*** (0.018)	-0.325*** (0.048)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.062** (0.023)	0.097*** (0.019)	0.048** (0.019)	0.036** (0.013)	0.110*** (0.029)
<i>PR System</i>	0.023 (0.220)	-0.602 (0.438)	-0.620*** (0.185)	-0.038 (0.228)	-0.153 (0.253)
<i>Female* PR System</i>	-0.039 (0.032)	-0.167*** (0.039)	-0.053 (0.039)	-0.056* (0.023)	-0.124* (0.063)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.052 (0.060)	0.078 (0.093)	0.063 (0.050)	0.111* (0.052)	0.099 (0.096)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.352 (0.227)	1.177** (0.430)	0.416+ (0.216)	-0.090 (0.199)	-0.510* (0.256)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.741** (0.254)	-0.736 (0.582)	0.839** (0.261)	-0.178 (0.210)	0.063 (0.358)
<i>Education</i>	0.180*** (0.006)	0.187*** (0.006)	0.187*** (0.006)	0.069*** (0.004)	0.107*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.143*** (0.006)	0.107*** (0.007)	0.096*** (0.007)	0.055*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.012)
<i>Age</i>	0.082*** (0.003)	0.041*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.016** (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.785** (1.852)	-12.148** (3.838)	-6.268*** (1.838)	-1.782 (1.679)	0.701 (2.095)
<i>N</i>	147,974	102,459	57,766	144,186	42,902
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	37	43	34
<i>Num. Elections</i>	104	77	46	104	34

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table C4. Summary Results for Voting: Effect of Quotas, Women’s Numeric Representation, PR, and Proportionality**

	<b>Results in Table 1 in manuscript</b>	<b>Excluding Presidential Elections (Table C1 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for Gender Quotas (Table C2 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for PR System (Table C3 Online Appendix)</b>
Female	Negative***	Negative***	Negative***	Negative+
%Women in Legislature	Positive*	Positive (NS)	Positive**	
Female* %Women in Legislature	Positive***	Positive***	Positive***	
Proportionality	Positive (NS)	Positive (NS)		
Female*Proportionality	Negative**	Negative*		
Gender Quota			Negative***	
Female*Gender Quota			Positive (NS)	
PR				Positive (NS)
Female*PR				Negative (NS)

NS=Not Significant; + $p<0.1$ ; \* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*  $p<0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p<0.001$



**Table C5. Summary Results for Political Party Information: Effect of Quotas, Women’s Numeric Representation, PR, and Proportionality**

	<b>Results in Table 1 in manuscript</b>	<b>Excluding Presidential Elections (Table C1 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for Gender Quotas (Table C2 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for PR System (Table C3 Online Appendix)</b>
Female	Negative***	Negative***	Negative***	Negative***
%Women in Legislature	Negative (NS)	Negative (NS)	Negative (NS)	
Female* %Women in Legislature	Positive (NS)	Negative (NS)	Positive (NS)	
Proportionality	Negative (NS)	Negative (NS)		
Female*Proportionality	Negative*	Negative (NS)		
Gender Quota			Negative (NS)	
Female*Gender Quota			Positive**	
PR				Negative (NS)
Female*PR				Negative***

NS=Not Significant; + $p<0.1$ ; \* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*  $p<0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p<0.001$

**Table C6. Summary Results for Campaign Attentiveness: Effect of Quotas, Women’s Numeric Representation, PR, and Proportionality**

	<b>Results in Table 1 in manuscript</b>	<b>Excluding Presidential Elections (Table C1 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for Gender Quotas (Table C2 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for PR System (Table C3 Online Appendix)</b>
Female	Negative***	Negative***	Negative***	Negative***
%Women in Legislature	Positive (NS)	Positive (NS)	Positive (NS)	
Female* %Women in Legislature	Positive*	Positive**	Positive***	
Proportionality	Negative+	Negative (NS)		
Female*Proportionality	Positive (NS)	Negative (NS)		
Gender Quota			Positive (NS)	
Female*Gender Quota			Positive**	
PR				Negative***
Female*PR				Negative (NS)

NS=Not Significant; + $p<0.1$ ; \* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*  $p<0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p<0.001$

**Table C7. Summary Results for Political Party Attachment: Effect of Quotas, Women’s Numeric Representation, PR, and Proportionality**

	<b>Results in Table 1 in manuscript</b>	<b>Excluding Presidential Elections (Table C1 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for Gender Quotas (Table C2 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for PR System (Table C3 Online Appendix)</b>
Female	Negative***	Negative***	Negative***	Negative***
%Women in Legislature	Positive (NS)	Positive (NS)	Positive (NS)	
Female* %Women in Legislature	Positive***	Positive***	Positive***	
Proportionality	Positive (NS)	Negative (NS)		
Female*Proportionality	Negative (NS)	Negative (NS)		
Gender Quota			Positive (NS)	
Female*Gender Quota			Negative (NS)	
PR				Negative (NS)
Female*PR*				Negative*

NS=Not Significant; + $p<0.1$ ; \* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*  $p<0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p<0.001$

**Table C8. Summary Results for Campaign Participation: Effect of Quotas, Women’s Numeric Representation, PR, and Proportionality**

	<b>Results in Table 1 in manuscript</b>	<b>Excluding Presidential Elections (Table C1 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for Gender Quotas (Table C2 Online Appendix)</b>	<b>Controlling for PR System (Table C3 Online Appendix)</b>
Female	Negative+	Negative+	Negative***	Negative***
%Women in Legislature	Negative (NS)	Negative (NS)	Negative (NS)	
Female* %Women in Legislature	Negative (NS)	Positive (NS)	Positive*	
Proportionality	Negative+	Negative*		
Female*Proportionality	Positive***	Positive**		
Gender Quota			Negative (NS)	
Female*Gender Quota			Positive (NS)	
PR				Negative (NS)
Female*PR*				Negative*

NS=Not Significant; + $p<0.1$ ; \* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*  $p<0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p<0.001$

**Box C1. Discussion of Findings of Inclusive Institutions in Appendix B and Table 1 in the Manuscript**

When we explore the effects of women’s numeric representation and proportionality on the gender gap, the results vary across dependent variables and model specifications. The results in Table 1 show that the impacts of these two variables are not as consistent across models, and that in some instances the coefficients, either individually or interacted with female, show the opposite expected sign. One possibility is that the effects of women’s numeric representation in the legislature and proportionality become more consistent if post-presidential election surveys are excluded from the analysis; however, we continue to find mixed results when restricting the sample to post-legislative surveys.<sup>39</sup> We find that for some dependent variables and model specifications, women’s numeric representation and proportionality are associated with lower electoral engagement even among women.<sup>40</sup>

When we control for quota implementation, for example, a higher percentage of women in the legislature is associated with a *lower* probability of campaign participation, with men showing a sharper decline in this probability than women (see Figure C1 below). Since a higher representation of women in the legislature is typically associated with the adoption of *effective* gender quotas, this counterintuitive result might be capturing citizens’ disapproval of the adoption of this type of gender-based affirmative action policy (e.g., see Clayton, 2015), particularly among men—who are less likely to perceive themselves as beneficiaries of gender quotas. Thus, low approval for gender quota laws might result in lower participation in electoral campaigns in countries where women have a high presence in politics.


In the case of PR and proportionality, we observe that these variables exert a negative effect on several dependent variables. One explanation for this is that systems associated with fewer political parties, such as plurality, might make it easier for citizens to identify a preferred political party than PR systems, thereby promoting political participation. These negative trends mirror the findings of recent studies (Beauregard, 2014; Nir & McClurg, 2015); however, we do not find negative effects across all dependent variables. Overall, our findings associated with the effect of gender quotas and PR reflect the inconsistent patterns that have already been documented in the literature. By contrast, we find that, at least when it comes to electoral engagement, enforced compulsory voting is more consistently associated with smaller gender gaps.

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<sup>39</sup> See Table C2.

<sup>40</sup> Our discussion is based on the different model specifications presented in Tables C2-C4. We summarize the results of these analyses for each dependent variable in Tables C23-C27.

**Figure C1. Effect of Women's Numeric Representation in the Legislature on Participation in Electoral Campaigns, by Sex**



**Note:** Results based on Model 5 in Table C2.

# **APPENDIX D: FURTHER ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS**

**Table D1. Replication of Results Using Original Coding of Campaign Attentiveness**

	<b>Campaign Attentiveness (Original Scale)</b>
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.092 (0.088)
<i>Female</i>	-0.500*** (0.069)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.067*** (0.018)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.012 (0.009)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.006** (0.002)
<i>Proportionality</i>	-0.059* (0.025)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	0.011* (0.005)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.125** (0.039)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.053 (0.062)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.780** (0.243)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	1.315*** (0.250)
<i>Education</i>	0.181*** (0.005)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.096*** (0.006)
<i>Age</i>	0.009*** (0.003)
<i>Age Squared</i>	0.000** (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	6.804*** (2.035)
<i>N</i>	55,660
<i>Num. Countries</i>	35
<i>Num. Elections</i>	44

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on an ordered logistic multilevel model with random effects for the intercept.



**Table D2. Replication of Results Specifying a Random Coefficient for Female**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.574*** (0.084)	0.630* (0.281)	0.079 (0.094)	0.320** (0.098)	0.134 (0.143)
<i>Female</i>	-0.286*** (0.085)	-0.657*** (0.168)	-0.490*** (0.116)	-0.282*** (0.072)	-0.276+ (0.154)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.093** (0.030)	0.085* (0.041)	0.066* (0.029)	0.044* (0.021)	0.104* (0.043)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.023* (0.009)	0.005 (0.032)	0.010 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.013)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005* (0.002)	0.000 (0.005)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.007 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.058)	-0.051+ (0.027)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.032 (0.021)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.009 (0.009)	0.002 (0.005)	0.019* (0.008)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.078+ (0.045)	-0.174+ (0.090)	-0.116** (0.041)	-0.020 (0.043)	0.067 (0.078)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.208* (0.088)	-0.131 (0.151)	-0.046 (0.063)	0.109 (0.069)	-0.221 (0.213)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.362 (0.244)	0.846 (0.582)	0.750** (0.253)	-0.282 (0.220)	0.285 (0.409)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.551* (0.236)	-1.390** (0.525)	1.203*** (0.266)	-0.312 (0.209)	-0.022 (0.333)
<i>Education</i>	0.187*** (0.006)	0.189*** (0.007)	0.186*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.004)	0.107*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.154*** (0.007)	0.112*** (0.008)	0.096*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.005)	0.011 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.080*** (0.003)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.941 (1.848)	-5.692 (5.317)	-8.615*** (2.134)	0.188 (1.836)	-3.387 (2.446)
<i>N</i>	138,074	98,081	55,660	134,651	40,555
Num. Countries	44	40	35	43	32
Num. Elections	104	77	44	104	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept and slope for *female*.

**Table D3. Effect of Compulsory Voting on the Gender Gap in Other Outcomes (Contacting a Politician, Participating in a Protest, and Factual Political Knowledge)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Contacted Politician	Contacted Politician	Protest Behavior	Protest Behavior	Factual Political Knowledge	Factual Political Knowledge
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.287*	0.266*	0.125	0.136	0.001	0.003
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.006)	(0.006)
<i>Female</i>	-0.269***	-0.084	-0.166***	-0.261*	-0.096***	-0.061***
	(0.030)	(0.111)	(0.033)	(0.131)	(0.003)	(0.013)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>		0.047		-0.022		-0.002
		(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.003)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.012	0.014	0.030*	0.027*	0.000	0.001
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>		-0.004		0.007+		-0.001***
		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.000)
<i>Proportionality</i>	-0.048*	-0.055**	-0.071**	-0.075***	0.001	0.001
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.001)	(0.001)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>		0.016**		0.009		0.001
		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.001)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	0.015	0.014	0.092	0.092	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.003)	(0.003)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.267	-0.267	-0.084	-0.083	0.013*	0.013*
	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.006)	(0.006)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	1.182**	1.182**	0.424	0.425	-0.053**	-0.052**
	(0.365)	(0.365)	(0.413)	(0.412)	(0.016)	(0.016)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.059	0.058	0.146	0.146	0.027*	0.027*
	(0.309)	(0.309)	(0.349)	(0.348)	(0.014)	(0.014)
<i>Education</i>	0.191***	0.191***	0.217***	0.216***	0.055***	0.055***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.001)	(0.001)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.070***	0.070***	-0.018	-0.017	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
<i>Age</i>	0.071***	0.071***	0.013*	0.013*	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-13.901***	-13.978***	-7.921**	-7.875**	0.794***	0.771***
	(2.253)	(2.250)	(2.538)	(2.534)	(0.121)	(0.121)
<i>N</i>	41,495	41,495	41,403	41,403	113,372	113,372
<i>Num. Countries</i>	33	33	33	33	40	40
<i>Num. Elections</i>	33	33	33	33	90	90

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D4. Replication of Results Using Alternative Count Indexes of Electoral Engagement as Dependent Variables**

	(1) Index of Electoral Engagement (based on variables included in Wave 2)	(2) Index of Electoral Engagement (based on variables included in Wave 3)
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.134** (0.044)	0.141** (0.049)
<i>Female</i>	-0.193*** (0.030)	-0.376*** (0.036)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.024** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.009)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.003** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
<i>Proportionality</i>	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.013)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	0.005** (0.002)	-0.007* (0.003)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	0.004 (0.022)	-0.074*** (0.021)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.150* (0.065)	-0.007 (0.033)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.333** (0.124)	0.348* (0.137)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	-0.143 (0.104)	0.352** (0.130)
<i>Education</i>	0.070*** (0.003)	0.093*** (0.003)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.043*** (0.004)	0.072*** (0.003)
<i>Age</i>	0.022*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.001)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.297 (0.758)	-1.812 (1.159)
<i>N</i>	42,968	56,704
<i>Num. Countries</i>	32	35
<i>Num. Elections</i>	33	44

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D5. Replication of Results Recoding the CV Index as a Dichotomous Variable**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV)</i>	1.272*** (0.279)	1.185* (0.575)	0.271 (0.242)	0.437 (0.293)	0.385 (0.328)
<i>Female</i>	-0.334*** (0.062)	-0.806*** (0.071)	-0.558*** (0.078)	-0.327*** (0.046)	-0.240* (0.113)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.134** (0.049)	0.329*** (0.044)	0.230*** (0.047)	0.109*** (0.031)	0.232** (0.072)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.016 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.022)	0.010 (0.009)	0.003 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.013)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.010 (0.022)	-0.029 (0.045)	-0.050+ (0.026)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.040+ (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.010* (0.004)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.019*** (0.005)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.062 (0.051)	-0.025 (0.103)	-0.114** (0.041)	-0.060 (0.053)	0.023 (0.073)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.110 (0.106)	0.038 (0.133)	-0.019 (0.064)	0.129 (0.079)	-0.247 (0.211)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.286 (0.294)	1.733*** (0.523)	0.775** (0.245)	-0.358 (0.269)	0.380 (0.404)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.802** (0.264)	-0.561 (0.597)	1.235*** (0.248)	0.046 (0.253)	0.099 (0.324)
<i>Education</i>	0.187*** (0.006)	0.188*** (0.006)	0.186*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.004)	0.107*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.155*** (0.007)	0.113*** (0.008)	0.096*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.005)	0.011 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.080*** (0.003)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.384 (2.266)	-17.473*** (4.873)	-9.258*** (2.170)	0.990 (2.321)	-3.936 (2.521)
<i>N</i>	138,074	98,081	55,660	134,651	40,555
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	35	43	32
<i>Num. Elections</i>	104	77	44	104	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D6. Size of Gender Gap: Continuous vs. Dichotomous CV Index**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Gender gap at highest value of CV Index (continuous measure)</b>	<b>Gender gap when CV Index is dichotomous and equal to 1 (0=voluntary voting; 1=compulsory)</b>
Voting	0.3%	-0.1%
Political Party Information	-0.5%	-2.4%***
Campaign Attentiveness	-4.4%***	-6.2%***
Political Party Attachment	-0.6%	-2.6%***
Campaign Participation	-1.7%	-2.4%***


+ $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table D7. Replication of Results Recoding the CV Index as a *Categorical Variable***

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Pol. Party Attachment
<i>CV with Low or Moderate Enforcement (=1; 0=Voluntary Voting)</i>	0.436 (0.340)	0.245 (0.742)	0.060 (0.365)
<i>CV with High Enforcement (=1; 0=Voluntary Voting)</i>	1.908*** (0.318)	2.597** (0.884)	0.854* (0.384)
<i>Female</i>	-0.334*** (0.062)	-0.821*** (0.072)	-0.324*** (0.047)
<i>Female*CV Low or Moderate Enforcement</i>	0.092+ (0.056)	0.357*** (0.051)	0.099* (0.039)
<i>Female*CV High Enforcement</i>	0.269** (0.094)	0.269*** (0.070)	0.122** (0.045)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.017 (0.010)	-0.021 (0.025)	0.000 (0.012)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.019 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.047)	0.014 (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.069 (0.047)	0.004 (0.112)	-0.062 (0.052)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.258* (0.105)	-0.111 (0.207)	0.096 (0.081)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.468+ (0.269)	1.879** (0.613)	-0.323 (0.264)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.681** (0.245)	-1.007 (0.646)	-0.036 (0.255)
<i>Education</i>	0.187*** (0.006)	0.188*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.004)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.155*** (0.007)	0.113*** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.005)
<i>Age</i>	0.080*** (0.003)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.123 (2.043)	-16.665** (5.132)	1.176 (2.263)
<i>N</i>	138,074	98,081	134,651
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	43
<i>Num. Elections</i>	104	77	104


+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept. The original 5 point scale of the CV Index was recoded as follows: Voluntary Voting=0; *CV with Low or Moderate Enforcement (1 and 2 values of original index)*=1; *CV with High Enforcement (3 and 4 values of original index)*=2.

**Figure D1. Gender Gap in Voting (CV as categorical)**



**Note:** Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities. Panel B graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results are based on Model 1 in Table D7.


**Figure D2. Gender Gap in Political Party Information (CV as categorical)**



**Note:** Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities. Panel B graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results are based on Model 2 in Table D7.



**Figure D3. Gender Gap in Political Party Attachment (CV as categorical)**



**Note:** Panel A displays mean predicted probabilities. Panel B graphs differences in mean predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Results are based on Model 3 in Table D7.

**Table D8. Replication of Results Controlling for *Union Membership***

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.601*** (0.095)	0.780** (0.284)	0.095 (0.097)	0.373*** (0.101)	0.180 (0.171)
<i>Female</i>	-0.368*** (0.066)	-0.701*** (0.078)	-0.544*** (0.081)	-0.322*** (0.047)	-0.179 (0.120)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.139*** (0.029)	0.101*** (0.027)	0.074*** (0.022)	0.080*** (0.016)	0.110** (0.042)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.022* (0.010)	-0.004 (0.025)	0.010 (0.010)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.015)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.010*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.008 (0.020)	-0.030 (0.046)	-0.060* (0.027)	-0.004 (0.020)	-0.039 (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.011* (0.004)	-0.008+ (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	0.000 (0.003)	0.022*** (0.006)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.101* (0.046)	-0.023 (0.112)	-0.100* (0.043)	-0.040 (0.047)	0.014 (0.076)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.255** (0.098)	-0.034 (0.158)	-0.033 (0.064)	0.129 (0.082)	-0.280 (0.267)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.467+ (0.269)	1.804** (0.585)	0.759** (0.256)	-0.336 (0.255)	0.347 (0.470)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.659** (0.253)	-0.872 (0.655)	1.329*** (0.269)	0.184 (0.252)	0.072 (0.366)
<i>Education</i>	0.188*** (0.006)	0.186*** (0.007)	0.186*** (0.006)	0.067*** (0.004)	0.100*** (0.011)
<i>Union Membership</i>	0.242*** (0.025)	0.047 (0.030)	0.069* (0.028)	0.130*** (0.016)	0.278*** (0.044)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.149*** (0.007)	0.112*** (0.008)	0.093*** (0.008)	0.058*** (0.005)	0.001 (0.014)
<i>Age</i>	0.076*** (0.003)	0.044*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.006)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.181 (1.980)	-17.447*** (5.114)	-9.037*** (2.177)	0.468 (2.030)	-3.222 (2.518)
<i>N</i>	125,055	89,869	52,128	121,427	35,893
<i>Num. Countries</i>	42	39	33	41	30
<i>Num. Elections</i>	98	73	42	97	30

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D9. Replication of Results Controlling for Size of Town**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.671*** (0.130)	0.803** (0.258)	0.060 (0.096)	0.192 (0.112)	0.170 (0.156)
<i>Female</i>	-0.345*** (0.065)	-0.696*** (0.070)	-0.594*** (0.083)	-0.347*** (0.047)	-0.221* (0.110)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.098** (0.031)	0.094*** (0.021)	0.081*** (0.022)	0.072*** (0.015)	0.101** (0.031)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.011 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.022)	0.007 (0.009)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.014)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.015 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.043)	-0.048 (0.027)	0.001 (0.020)	-0.037 (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.008+ (0.004)	0.002 (0.006)	0.000 (0.003)	0.020*** (0.005)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.080 (0.052)	0.020 (0.103)	-0.110* (0.043)	-0.101* (0.049)	0.020 (0.079)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.203* (0.098)	-0.015 (0.144)	-0.045 (0.063)	0.115 (0.079)	-0.288 (0.275)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.284 (0.286)	1.561** (0.539)	0.837** (0.277)	-0.353 (0.249)	0.432 (0.482)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.588* (0.247)	-1.332* (0.637)	1.412*** (0.319)	0.217 (0.249)	0.024 (0.357)
<i>Education</i>	0.193*** (0.006)	0.175*** (0.007)	0.170*** (0.006)	0.065*** (0.004)	0.112*** (0.011)
<i>Size of Town</i>	-0.030*** (0.008)	0.074*** (0.009)	0.080*** (0.009)	0.014* (0.006)	-0.035* (0.015)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.158*** (0.007)	0.108*** (0.008)	0.093*** (0.008)	0.060*** (0.005)	0.014 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.080*** (0.003)	0.045*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.017** (0.006)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.924 (2.217)	-15.424** (4.744)	-9.599*** (2.345)	1.203 (2.043)	-3.850 (2.553)
<i>N</i>	122,495	91,049	50,762	120,930	38,426
Num. Countries	41	39	32	41	31
Num. Elections	95	73	41	95	31

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D10. Replication of Results Controlling for *Marital Status***

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.589*** (0.094)	0.742** (0.270)	0.060 (0.094)	0.299** (0.109)	0.159 (0.155)
<i>Female</i>	-0.311*** (0.064)	-0.689*** (0.070)	-0.525*** (0.080)	-0.305*** (0.046)	-0.192+ (0.109)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.100*** (0.027)	0.094*** (0.021)	0.072*** (0.020)	0.058*** (0.014)	0.103*** (0.031)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.023* (0.010)	-0.010 (0.024)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.014)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.009 (0.020)	-0.026 (0.046)	-0.050+ (0.027)	0.008 (0.022)	-0.038+ (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	0.000 (0.003)	0.021*** (0.005)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.097* (0.047)	-0.022 (0.111)	-0.114** (0.042)	-0.067 (0.052)	0.019 (0.078)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.218* (0.096)	-0.051 (0.165)	-0.052 (0.064)	0.060 (0.084)	-0.297 (0.274)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.397 (0.266)	1.886** (0.591)	0.746** (0.256)	-0.169 (0.270)	0.444 (0.480)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.745** (0.244)	-0.976 (0.652)	1.256*** (0.264)	-0.035 (0.254)	0.014 (0.356)
<i>Education</i>	0.198*** (0.006)	0.187*** (0.007)	0.187*** (0.006)	0.071*** (0.004)	0.100*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.125*** (0.007)	0.108*** (0.008)	0.090*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.005)	0.016 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.074*** (0.003)	0.042*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.022*** (0.006)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
<i>Married (0=single)</i>	0.130*** (0.024)	0.019 (0.028)	0.005 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.120* (0.049)
<i>Divorced, Widow (0=single)</i>	-0.299*** (0.032)	-0.071+ (0.038)	-0.085* (0.037)	-0.119*** (0.024)	-0.063 (0.065)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.981 (2.015)	-17.843*** (5.108)	-8.533*** (2.157)	0.059 (2.228)	-3.947 (2.541)
<i>N</i>	133,291	96,785	55,463	129,618	39,454
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	35	43	31
<i>Num. Elections</i>	100	76	44	99	31

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D11. Replication of Results Controlling for *Satisfaction with Democracy***

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV)</i>	0.557*** (0.091)	0.748** (0.271)	0.046 (0.098)	0.302** (0.106)	0.158 (0.145)
<i>Female</i>	-0.331*** (0.066)	-0.690*** (0.073)	-0.489*** (0.083)	-0.260*** (0.047)	-0.163 (0.110)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.105*** (0.027)	0.101*** (0.022)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.055*** (0.014)	0.100*** (0.029)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.019* (0.010)	-0.014 (0.024)	0.009 (0.010)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.013)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.004** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.011 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.046)	-0.061* (0.028)	0.007 (0.021)	-0.036+ (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.008+ (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.003)	0.022*** (0.005)
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy</i>	-0.317*** (0.012)	-0.066*** (0.013)	0.298*** (0.013)	-0.243*** (0.008)	0.073*** (0.022)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.086+ (0.045)	-0.015 (0.112)	-0.094* (0.043)	-0.050 (0.051)	0.020 (0.074)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.225* (0.092)	-0.035 (0.158)	-0.016 (0.065)	0.102 (0.078)	-0.273 (0.214)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.294 (0.255)	1.847** (0.582)	0.598* (0.259)	-0.325 (0.254)	0.357 (0.410)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.639** (0.236)	-0.958 (0.652)	1.307*** (0.273)	-0.055 (0.254)	0.011 (0.341)
<i>Education</i>	0.180*** (0.006)	0.171*** (0.007)	0.180*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.004)	0.101*** (0.011)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.141*** (0.007)	0.107*** (0.008)	0.080*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.079*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.003)	0.008* (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.971 (1.942)	-17.252*** (5.111)	-8.272*** (2.205)	1.680 (2.132)	-3.358 (2.494)
<i>N</i>	130,315	92,667	52,768	127,094	38,120
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	34	43	32
<i>Num. Elections</i>	102	76	43	102	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D12. Replication of Results Controlling for Satisfaction with Democracy Interacted with Female Variable**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV)</i>	0.559*** (0.091)	0.749** (0.271)	0.046 (0.098)	0.302** (0.106)	0.158 (0.145)
<i>Female</i>	-0.472*** (0.089)	-0.770*** (0.097)	-0.433*** (0.102)	-0.282*** (0.059)	-0.309* (0.148)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.101*** (0.027)	0.100*** (0.022)	0.074*** (0.022)	0.056*** (0.014)	0.103*** (0.029)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.019+ (0.010)	-0.014 (0.024)	0.009 (0.010)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.013)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.009*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.004** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.011 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.046)	-0.061* (0.028)	0.007 (0.021)	-0.036 (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.007+ (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)	0.001 (0.003)	0.022*** (0.005)
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy</i>	-0.342*** (0.016)	-0.084*** (0.019)	0.310*** (0.018)	0.239*** (0.011)	0.046 (0.028)
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy*Female</i>	0.050* (0.022)	0.031 (0.025)	-0.023 (0.025)	0.009 (0.015)	0.060 (0.041)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.086+ (0.045)	-0.015 (0.112)	-0.094* (0.043)	-0.050 (0.051)	0.020 (0.073)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.225* (0.092)	-0.035 (0.158)	-0.016 (0.065)	0.102 (0.078)	-0.274 (0.214)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.294 (0.255)	1.846** (0.582)	0.599* (0.259)	-0.325 (0.254)	0.359 (0.409)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.639** (0.237)	-0.958 (0.652)	1.307*** (0.273)	-0.055 (0.254)	0.011 (0.340)
<i>Education</i>	0.180*** (0.006)	0.171*** (0.007)	0.180*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.004)	0.100*** (0.011)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.140*** (0.007)	0.107*** (0.008)	0.080*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.079*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.003)	0.008* (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.903 (1.945)	-17.206*** (5.108)	-8.306*** (2.205)	0.476 (2.131)	-3.297 (2.493)
<i>N</i>	130,315	92,667	52,768	127,094	38,120
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	34	43	32
<i>Num. Elections</i>	102	76	43	102	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D13. Replication of Results Controlling for Political Efficacy (Who is in Power Can Make a Difference)**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.580*** (0.088)	0.731** (0.247)	0.067 (0.094)	0.306** (0.108)	0.177 (0.146)
<i>Female</i>	-0.313*** (0.065)	-0.701*** (0.072)	-0.486*** (0.084)	-0.297*** (0.046)	-0.208+ (0.109)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.083*** (0.025)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.069** (0.021)	0.042** (0.014)	0.099*** (0.029)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.023* (0.010)	-0.012 (0.023)	0.018+ (0.010)	0.003 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.013)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.009*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.006 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.043)	-0.074** (0.027)	0.006 (0.022)	-0.044* (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.008+ (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	0.000 (0.003)	0.020*** (0.005)
<i>Political Efficacy</i>	-0.038*** (0.007)	-0.015+ (0.008)	0.286*** (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.234*** (0.014)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.089* (0.045)	-0.050 (0.104)	-0.114** (0.042)	-0.071 (0.051)	0.014 (0.074)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.235* (0.091)	-0.027 (0.148)	-0.051 (0.063)	0.118 (0.078)	-0.266 (0.216)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.470+ (0.256)	1.676** (0.553)	0.698** (0.266)	-0.285 (0.261)	0.428 (0.413)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.656** (0.236)	-0.942 (0.601)	1.327*** (0.267)	-0.066 (0.251)	0.027 (0.344)
<i>Education</i>	0.181*** (0.006)	0.179*** (0.007)	0.175*** (0.006)	0.064*** (0.004)	0.093*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.150*** (0.007)	0.107*** (0.008)	0.078*** (0.008)	0.058*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.079*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.014* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.409+ (1.951)	-15.818*** (4.803)	-9.376*** (2.221)	0.570 (2.185)	-3.511 (2.514)
<i>N</i>	130,046	93,199	51,717	128,133	39,598
Num. Countries	44	40	33	43	32
Num. Elections	102	75	42	102	32

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D14. Replication of Results Controlling for *Political Efficacy (Who is in Power Can Make a Difference)* Interacted with *Female***

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.578*** (0.088)	0.731** (0.247)	0.068 (0.094)	0.305** (0.108)	0.177 (0.146)
<i>Female</i>	-0.275*** (0.070)	-0.665*** (0.081)	-0.359*** (0.109)	-0.279*** (0.050)	-0.226+ (0.118)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.086*** (0.025)	0.093*** (0.021)	0.068** (0.021)	0.043** (0.014)	0.099*** (0.029)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.023* (0.010)	-0.012 (0.023)	0.018+ (0.010)	0.003 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.013)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.009*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.007 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.043)	-0.075** (0.027)	0.006 (0.022)	-0.044* (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.008+ (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.008 (0.006)	0.000 (0.003)	0.020*** (0.005)
<i>Political Efficacy</i>	-0.028** (0.009)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.301*** (0.011)	-0.035*** (0.006)	-0.239*** (0.018)
<i>Female*Political Efficacy</i>	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.029+ (0.016)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.011 (0.027)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.089* (0.045)	-0.050 (0.104)	-0.114** (0.042)	-0.071 (0.051)	0.014 (0.074)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.235* (0.091)	-0.027 (0.148)	-0.051 (0.063)	0.118 (0.078)	-0.266 (0.216)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.470+ (0.256)	1.677** (0.553)	0.698** (0.266)	-0.285 (0.261)	0.428 (0.413)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.656** (0.236)	-0.942 (0.601)	1.327*** (0.267)	-0.066 (0.251)	0.027 (0.344)
<i>Education</i>	0.181*** (0.006)	0.179*** (0.007)	0.175*** (0.006)	0.064*** (0.004)	0.093*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.150*** (0.007)	0.107*** (0.008)	0.078*** (0.008)	0.058*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.079*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.014* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.432+ (1.950)	-15.842*** (4.806)	-9.444*** (2.222)	0.561 (2.186)	-3.503 (2.515)
<i>N</i>	130,046	93,199	51,717	128,133	39,598
Num. Countries	44	40	33	43	32
Num. Elections	102	75	42	102	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.



**Table D15. Replication of Results Controlling for Political Efficacy (Who You Vote for Can Make a Difference)**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.599*** (0.088)	0.729** (0.250)	0.063 (0.081)	0.313** (0.109)	0.171 (0.150)
<i>Female</i>	-0.318*** (0.066)	-0.690*** (0.072)	-0.546*** (0.083)	-0.299*** (0.047)	-0.194+ (0.109)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.106*** (0.025)	0.093*** (0.021)	0.080*** (0.021)	0.045** (0.014)	0.104*** (0.029)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.020* (0.010)	-0.011 (0.023)	0.010 (0.008)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.014)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.001 (0.019)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.057* (0.023)	0.004 (0.022)	-0.041+ (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.022*** (0.005)
<i>Political Efficacy</i>	0.356*** (0.007)	0.104*** (0.008)	0.319*** (0.008)	0.294*** (0.005)	0.246*** (0.015)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.097* (0.044)	-0.019 (0.105)	-0.126*** (0.035)	-0.077 (0.052)	0.016 (0.078)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.214* (0.090)	-0.027 (0.152)	-0.049 (0.058)	0.119 (0.078)	-0.254 (0.220)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.381 (0.250)	1.728** (0.557)	0.767** (0.233)	-0.327 (0.262)	0.387 (0.422)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.534* (0.232)	-0.981 (0.603)	1.221*** (0.204)	-0.161 (0.254)	-0.023 (0.350)
<i>Education</i>	0.165*** (0.006)	0.171*** (0.007)	0.172*** (0.006)	0.051*** (0.004)	0.095*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.143*** (0.007)	0.107*** (0.008)	0.084*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.081*** (0.003)	0.041*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.101* (1.905)	-16.942*** (4.815)	-9.905*** (1.923)	-0.160 (2.206)	-4.705+ (2.592)
<i>N</i>	127,998	91,122	51,102	126,122	38,238
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	35	43	31
<i>Num. Elections</i>	101	74	42	101	31

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D16. Replication of Results Controlling for Political Efficacy (Who You Vote for Can Make a Difference) Interacted with Female**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.600*** (0.088)	0.728** (0.250)	0.064 (0.081)	0.313** (0.109)	0.171 (0.150)
<i>Female</i>	-0.194* (0.082)	-0.578*** (0.094)	-0.567*** (0.109)	-0.305*** (0.063)	-0.177 (0.166)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.103*** (0.025)	0.094*** (0.021)	0.079*** (0.021)	0.045** (0.014)	0.105*** (0.029)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.020* (0.010)	-0.011 (0.023)	0.010 (0.008)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.014)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.000 (0.019)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.057* (0.023)	0.004 (0.022)	-0.041+ (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.008+ (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.022*** (0.005)
<i>Political Efficacy</i>	0.374*** (0.010)	0.121*** (0.012)	0.316*** (0.012)	0.293*** (0.007)	0.247*** (0.020)
<i>Female*Political Efficacy</i>	-0.034* (0.013)	-0.029+ (0.015)	0.005 (0.017)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.029)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.097* (0.044)	-0.019 (0.105)	-0.126*** (0.035)	-0.077 (0.052)	0.016 (0.078)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.214* (0.090)	-0.026 (0.152)	-0.049 (0.058)	0.119 (0.078)	-0.254 (0.220)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.381 (0.250)	1.727** (0.557)	0.767** (0.233)	-0.327 (0.262)	0.387 (0.422)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.534* (0.232)	-0.981 (0.603)	1.221*** (0.204)	-0.161 (0.254)	-0.023 (0.350)
<i>Education</i>	0.165*** (0.006)	0.171*** (0.007)	0.172*** (0.006)	0.051*** (0.004)	0.095*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.143*** (0.007)	0.107*** (0.008)	0.084*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.081*** (0.003)	0.041*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.169* (1.904)	-17.004*** (4.816)	-9.894*** (1.923)	-0.157 (2.207)	-4.713+ (2.593)
<i>N</i>	127,998	91,122	51,102	126,122	38,238
Num. Countries	44	40	35	43	31
Num. Elections	101	74	42	101	31

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D17. Replication of Results Controlling for Surveys Conducted After First Round or Runoff Elections**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.598*** (0.090)	0.719** (0.255)	0.107 (0.093)	0.283** (0.105)	0.104 (0.138)
<i>Female</i>	-0.358*** (0.063)	-0.706*** (0.070)	-0.533*** (0.080)	-0.319*** (0.045)	-0.196+ (0.108)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.090*** (0.024)	0.093*** (0.020)	0.072*** (0.020)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.096*** (0.029)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.023* (0.010)	-0.011 (0.024)	0.007 (0.010)	0.005 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.013)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.009*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.009 (0.020)	-0.029 (0.045)	-0.020 (0.026)	0.006 (0.021)	-0.038+ (0.021)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.021*** (0.005)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.098* (0.047)	-0.041 (0.110)	-0.119** (0.043)	-0.078 (0.051)	0.041 (0.071)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.233* (0.094)	-0.040 (0.159)	-0.060 (0.067)	0.097 (0.078)	-0.338 (0.207)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.460+ (0.263)	1.868** (0.577)	0.697** (0.267)	-0.225 (0.265)	0.517 (0.398)
<i>Presidential Election, First Round</i>	0.644* (0.283)	-1.005 (0.719)	1.056*** (0.270)	-0.000 (0.278)	0.473 (0.379)
<i>Presidential Election, Run-off</i>	0.738* (0.287)	-0.745 (0.776)	0.948** (0.298)	0.264 (0.290)	-0.423 (0.411)
<i>Education</i>	0.187*** (0.006)	0.187*** (0.006)	0.186*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.004)	0.106*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.155*** (0.007)	0.114*** (0.008)	0.096*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.005)	0.011 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.080*** (0.003)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.519+ (1.993)	-17.726*** (5.028)	-7.652*** (2.222)	0.041 (2.218)	-4.068+ (2.442)
<i>N</i>	138,074	98,081	55,660	134,651	40,555
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	35	43	32
<i>Num. Elections</i>	104	77	44	104	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D18. Replication of Results Interacting GDP Per Capita, Democracy, and Effective Number of Parties with Female**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol. Party Info.	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.567*** (0.091)	0.757** (0.264)	0.073 (0.094)	0.289** (0.108)	0.143 (0.146)
<i>Female</i>	-0.796* (0.356)	1.110* (0.483)	0.052 (0.547)	-0.514+ (0.284)	-0.576 (0.780)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.116*** (0.028)	0.072** (0.026)	0.051* (0.024)	0.063*** (0.015)	0.143*** (0.034)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.022* (0.010)	-0.012 (0.024)	0.010 (0.010)	0.003 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.013)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.007 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.050+ (0.027)	0.007 (0.021)	-0.034 (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.007)	0.000 (0.003)	0.014* (0.006)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.087+ (0.047)	0.009 (0.110)	-0.118** (0.042)	-0.061 (0.051)	0.047 (0.074)
<i>Female*Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.020+ (0.011)	-0.051*** (0.010)	0.010 (0.011)	-0.021** (0.007)	-0.054* (0.021)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.207* (0.094)	-0.036 (0.156)	-0.046 (0.064)	0.116 (0.077)	-0.228 (0.217)
<i>Female*Democracy Level</i>	-0.017 (0.024)	-0.043* (0.017)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.094 (0.071)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.377 (0.261)	1.968*** (0.579)	0.780** (0.258)	-0.320 (0.259)	0.319 (0.415)
<i>Female*Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.078 (0.050)	-0.102+ (0.059)	-0.047 (0.066)	0.055 (0.037)	0.184 (0.136)
<i>Presidential Election</i>	0.680** (0.239)	-0.972 (0.645)	1.257*** (0.263)	-0.062 (0.249)	0.030 (0.342)
<i>Education Level</i>	0.188*** (0.006)	0.189*** (0.006)	0.186*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.004)	0.107*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.155*** (0.007)	0.113*** (0.008)	0.096*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.005)	0.011 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.080*** (0.003)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.028 (1.988)	-19.012*** (5.061)	-8.914*** (2.174)	0.732 (2.178)	-3.608 (2.524)
<i>N</i>	138,074	98,081	55,660	134,651	40,555
<i>Num. Countries</i>	44	40	35	43	32
<i>Num. Elections</i>	104	77	44	104	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D19. Replication of Results Excluding Outliers**

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol Party Info	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.581*** (0.093)	0.168 (0.236)	0.040 (0.098)	0.297** (0.110)	0.254+ (0.130)
<i>Female</i>	-0.351*** (0.064)	-0.744*** (0.071)	-0.557*** (0.084)	-0.324*** (0.046)	-0.370** (0.126)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.092*** (0.024)	0.099*** (0.020)	0.075*** (0.021)	0.044*** (0.013)	0.103*** (0.030)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.021* (0.011)	-0.012 (0.018)	0.009 (0.010)	0.003 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.008*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.008 (0.020)	0.031 (0.036)	-0.051+ (0.027)	0.005 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.029)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.010* (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.009 (0.010)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.098* (0.047)	0.026 (0.083)	-0.124** (0.044)	-0.074 (0.052)	0.019 (0.088)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.216* (0.097)	-0.041 (0.134)	-0.058 (0.066)	0.118 (0.078)	-0.124 (0.192)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.418 (0.271)	1.098* (0.465)	0.828** (0.291)	-0.322 (0.270)	0.125 (0.386)
<i>Presidential System</i>	0.685** (0.246)	-0.401 (0.517)	1.384*** (0.323)	-0.066 (0.253)	-0.277 (0.440)
<i>Education</i>	0.186*** (0.006)	0.185*** (0.006)	0.182*** (0.006)	0.069*** (0.004)	0.109*** (0.011)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.155*** (0.007)	0.113*** (0.008)	0.094*** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.014)
<i>Age</i>	0.082*** (0.003)	0.042*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.014* (0.006)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.300 (2.055)	-10.009* (4.019)	-9.157*** (2.421)	0.783 (2.263)	-2.802 (2.369)
<i>N</i>	134,056	91,281	51,758	130,903	38,552
<i>Num. Countries</i>	42	37	33	41	30
<i>Num. Elections</i>	100	72	42	100	30

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.

**Table D20. Replication of Results Estimating *Two-Level Models***

	(1) Voting	(2) Pol Party Info	(3) Campaign Attentiveness	(4) Pol. Party Attachment	(5) Campaign Participation
<i>Compulsory Voting (CV) Index</i>	0.590*** (0.079)	0.765** (0.246)	0.055 (0.094)	0.216* (0.087)	0.166 (0.146)
<i>Female</i>	-0.358*** (0.063)	-0.706*** (0.070)	-0.534*** (0.080)	-0.319*** (0.045)	-0.196+ (0.108)
<i>Female*Compulsory Voting Index</i>	0.090*** (0.024)	0.093*** (0.020)	0.072*** (0.020)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.096*** (0.029)
<i>% Women in Legislature</i>	0.023** (0.008)	-0.014 (0.022)	0.012 (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.013)
<i>Female*% Women in Legislature</i>	0.009*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Proportionality</i>	0.014 (0.018)	-0.024 (0.044)	-0.058* (0.027)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.037+ (0.022)
<i>Female*Proportionality</i>	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.021*** (0.005)
<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	-0.081* (0.041)	-0.030 (0.100)	-0.103* (0.040)	-0.075+ (0.044)	0.022 (0.074)
<i>Democracy Level</i>	-0.236** (0.085)	-0.034 (0.151)	-0.058 (0.062)	0.043 (0.078)	-0.271 (0.215)
<i>Log GDP per capita (PPP)</i>	0.539* (0.225)	1.893*** (0.534)	0.732** (0.244)	-0.103 (0.223)	0.405 (0.412)
<i>Presidential System</i>	0.585** (0.219)	-1.039+ (0.616)	1.318*** (0.267)	0.141 (0.240)	0.028 (0.343)
<i>Education</i>	0.188*** (0.006)	0.187*** (0.006)	0.186*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.004)	0.106*** (0.010)
<i>Income Level</i>	0.155*** (0.007)	0.114*** (0.008)	0.096*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.005)	0.011 (0.013)
<i>Age</i>	0.080*** (0.003)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013* (0.005)
<i>Age Squared</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.261* (1.723)	-17.986*** (4.636)	-8.428*** (2.074)	-0.428 (1.806)	-3.790 (2.507)
<i>N</i>	138,074	98,081	55,660	134,651	40,555
<i>Num. Elections</i>	104	77	44	104	32

+ $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Standard errors in parenthesis). Results based on logistic multilevel models with random effects for the intercept.